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THE IMPOVERISHED IDEA OF CffiCUIT-SPLITTING 
Carl Tobias* 
A half-decade ago, the United States Congress considered and rejected 
controversial measures that would have split the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit into two courts.1 The proposed Ninth Cir-
cuit would have included Arizona, California and Nevada, while the new 
Twelfth Circuit would have encompassed Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Mon-
tana, Oregon, Washington, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands. 
Congress fully aired, particularly in hearings before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, all of the issues that were salient to the Ninth Circuit's divi-
sion. Nevertheless, Congress ultimately refused to split the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals. 
Senators representing every state in the latest iteration of the projected 
Twelfth Circuit recently revived the idea by introducing Senate Bill 956, 
a proposal that closely resembles the measure debated by Congress in 
1990.2 The new bill's sponsors contend that certain factors, principally the 
Ninth Circuit's substantial size and burgeoning docket, have now made 
division of the court imperative. 
Comparison of the new and the earlier proposals and the underlying 
rationales of the measures reveals that they are virtually identical. Sena-
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank David Aronofsky, Thomas E. 
Baker, Arthur Hellman, Kathy Monzie, Jeff Renz, Peggy Sanner, and Ronald Waterman for valua-
ble suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this piece, as well as Ann and 
Tom Boone and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. I am a member of the Civil 
Justice Reform Act Advisory Group for the United States District Court for the District of Montana 
and of the District Local Rules Review Committee of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council. However, 
the views expressed here and errors that remain are my own. 
1 See S. 948, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989); see also Thomas E. Baker, On Redrawing 
Circuit Boundaries-Why the Proposal to Divide the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit is Not Such a Good Idea, 22 AR1z. ST. L.J. 917 (1990) (affording thorough analysis of S. 
948). 
2 See S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995) [hereinafter S. 956). The principal difference 
between S. 956 and S. 948 is that the new bill would leave Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mari-
ana Islands in the proposed Ninth Circuit rather than placing them in the proposed Twelfth Circuit. 
See S. 956, § 2; see also H.R. 4900, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 2 (1990} (proposing composition identical 
to S. 956 in earlier House bill}. S. 956's sponsors had earlier introduced a bill that differs from S. 956 
by authorizing seven, rather than nine, judges for the proposed Twelfth Circuit. See S. 853, 104th 
Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995). 
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tors and representatives closely examined the appellate court's bifurcation 
and found it inadvisable five years ago. Nothing consequential enough to 
require division has transpired since. These ideas suggest that Congress 
should leave the present Ninth Circuit intact. 
Senate Bill 956 and the issue of circuit-splitting, however, warrant 
careful analysis for several important reasons. There have been a few 
changes since the earlier bills were proposed. Some arguments for dividing 
the Ninth Circuit, such as its ever-expanding caseload and the time which 
it requires to decide appeals, may seem more persuasive today. The com-
position of the Congress is also quite different. These factors mean that 
senators and representatives could seriously consider bifurcation and may 
well split the Ninth Circuit. 
Even if the 104th Congress eschews division of the Ninth Circuit, bi-
furcation will remain significant. Senators from the Pacific Northwest pe-
rennially sponsor legislation to split the appellate court, while members of 
Congress representing other areas may introduce measures to divide other 
regional circuits. As appeals inexorably mount, pressure to address them 
will continue to intensify. In fact, bifurcation will remain important until 
Congress discovers remedies for the dilemma of multiplying dockets that 
do not involve appellate court division. These propositions show that Sen-
ate Bill 956 and circuit-splitting deserve evaluation, and this Article un-
dertakes that effort. 
The Article initially describes the origins and development of the pro-
posed legislation. It then assesses the measure and arguments for and 
against dividing the Ninth Circuit. I find that there is no greater need for 
bifurcation now than before and that the disadvantages of division quan-
titatively and qualitatively outweigh its benefits. Indeed, knowledgeable 
federal court observers differ over one of circuit-splitting's most frequently 
proffered justifications: that growing caseloads create complications which 
are sufficiently problematic to warrant solutions as controversial as divid-
ing appeals courts. Some experts even consider anachronistic the century-
long congressional practice of creating additional judgeships and bifur-
cating circuits. 
I recommend that Congress not split the Ninth Circuit, but rather ex-
plore fundamental reforms, several of which concern the entire appellate 
court system. If Congress believes that these alternatives and Senate Bill 
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956 are unpalatable, it should scrutinize comparatively modest ap-
proaches, principally more circuit experimentation and additional study of 
the appeals courts and their expanding dockets. Were Congress to find 
unpersuasive the strong evidence of the inadvisability of dividing circuits 
and to consider seriously the legislative proposal, this Article provides sug-
gestions for improving the measure.3 
I. ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SENATE BILL 956 
The origins and development of the recently introduced proposal to 
split the Ninth Circuit merit rather comprehensive analysis. Senate Bill 
956's historical background deserves a relatively thorough examination be-
cause it informs understanding of this measure, even though the origins, 
development, and congressional consideration of the legislation that would 
have created the Twelfth Circuit in 1990 have been evaluated elsewhere,4 
and virtually no new reasons have been advanced to support the Ninth 
Circuit's division. 
A. General Background 
' 
Congress instituted the modern appellate court system by passing the 
Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 1891, popularly known as the Evarts 
Act.11 In 1866, it established a newly numbered Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals consisting of California, Nevada, and Oregon.6 Congress included 
Montana and Washington within the appellate court's jurisdiction on 
3 At the outset I feel compelled to admit that comprehensive review of the wealth of literature 
which has been written on the appellate courts over the last century has left me somewhat uncertain 
about the exact nature of the problems that crowded dockets create, whether they are sufficiently 
troubling to deserve treatment and, if so, which solutions are preferable. 
• I rely substantially in this section and throughout this article on Baker, supra note 1, and on 
THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL (1994). I also rely heavily on RESTRUCTURING 
JUSTICE: THE INNOVATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT AND THE FUTURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 
(Arthur D. Hellman ed., 1990), and on the work of its editor and contributing authors, including 
Professor Paul Carrington and Professor Daniel Meador. See also Hearing on S. 948 Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice of the Senate Comm. on the judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d 
Sess. 18 (1990) [hereinafter S. 948 Hearing] (affording congressional testimony and much additional 
information on S. 948). 
• Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 32, 26 Stat. 826 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 41-49 
(1988)). See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER AND JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME 
COURT, A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 103-28 (1928). 
6 See Act of July 23, 1866, ch. 210, § 2, 14 Stat. 209 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)). 
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February 22, 1889 and added Idaho the next year,7 as those territories 
became states. Congress completed the present Ninth Circuit by including 
Hawaii in 1911,8 Alaska in 1925,9 Arizona in 1929,1° Guam in 1951,11 
and the Northern Mariana Islands in 1977 .12 
During the twentieth century, Congress has created two new courts of 
appeals and has redrawn circuit boundaries of a few courts. In 1948, 
Congress formally recognized the District of Columbia Circuit, 13 which 
primarily hears appeals that challenge administrative agency decision-
making.14 In 1982, Congress established the Federal Circuit and invested 
it with national, specialized subject matter jurisdiction principally involv-
ing customs, patents, trademarks, copyrights, and claims against the 
United States.111 
In 1929, Congress formed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals by re-
moving Colorado, Kansas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah, and Wyoming 
from the Eighth Circuit and leaving Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota within it.16 Congress 
7 See Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 21, 25 Stat. 682 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)) 
(adding Montana); Act of Feb. 22, 1889, ch. 180, § 21, 25 Stat. 676, 682 (current version at 28 
U.S.C. § 41 (1988)) (adding Washington); Act of July 3, 1890, ch. 656, § 16, 26 Stat. 215, 217 
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)) (adding Idaho). 
8 See Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 116, 36 Stat. 1131 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 
(1988)). 
9 Congress made Alaska district court decisions reviewable in the Ninth Circuit by the Act of 
Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 299, § 128(d), 43 Stat. 936 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1988)). 
10 See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, § 116, 45 Stat. 1346 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 
(1988)). 
11 See Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 34, 65 Stat. 723 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 
(1988)). 
12 See Act of Nov. 8, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-157, 91 Stat. 1265 (current version at 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1821 (1988)). 
13 See Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 41, 62 Stat. 870 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 
(1988)). See generally Patricia M. Wald, Life on the District of Columbia Circuit: Literally and 
Figuratively Halfway Between the Capitol and the White Hollse, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1987). 
14 See Spottswood W. Robinson, III, The D.C. Circuit: An Era of Change, 55 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 715 (1987); Colloquy, The Contributions of the D.C. Circuit to Administrative Law, 40 An-
MIN. L. REV. 507 (1988). 
15 See Act of Apr. 2, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 
(1988)). See generally Rochelle C. Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized 
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1989); United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit Tenth 
Anniversary Commemorative Issue, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559-1074 (1992). 
18 See Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch. 363, 45 Stat. 1346, 1347 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 
(1988)). 
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created the new appellate court as a response to caseload congestion in the 
Eighth Circuit.17 
In 1980, Congress established the Eleventh Circuit by detaching Ala-
bama, Florida, and Georgia from the Fifth Circuit and maintaining Loui-
siana, Mississippi, and Texas in that court.18 Numerous observers had 
voiced concerns about crowded dockets for several decades before Congress 
decided to split the Fifth Circuit.19 For instance, the number of cases that 
litigants appealed to the Fifth Circuit had increased ninefold over the 
third quarter of the twentieth century.20 
Congress based its decision to divide the Fifth Circuit in part on the 
recommendation of the Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Ap-
pellate System, popularly called the Hruska Commission for its chair, 
Senator Roman Hruska (R-Neb.).21 Congress created the Commission in 
response to the importunings of United States Supreme Court Chief Jus-
tice Warren Burger and other federal court judges.22 
After thorough study, the Commission proposed that Congress split the 
two largest circuits, the Fifth and the Ninth, rather than championing a 
more comprehensive solution, such as national reconfiguration of all of the 
17 See Baker, supra note 1, at 923-24. See generally Arthur J. Stanley & Irma S. Russell, The · 
Political and Administrative History of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, 60 
DEN. L.J. 119, 124-28 (1983). 
1
• Act of Oct. 14, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-452, 94 Stat. 1994 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 
(1988)). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S. 
C.C.A.N. 4236; Hearing on H.R. 6060, H.R. 7665, and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 96th Cong., 
2d Sess. 1 (1980); Baker, supra note 1, at 925-28. 
19 See, e.g., Charles Alan Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit: A Crisis in judicial Adminis-
tration, 42 TEX. L. REV. 949 (1964). See generally DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, 
A COURT DIVIDED-THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL 
REFORM (1988); HARVEY L. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 1891-1981 (1984). 
•• See Thomas G. Gee, The Imminent Destruction of the Fifth Circuit: Or, How Not To Deal 
with a Blossoming Docket, 9 TEX. TECH L. REV. 799, 799 (1978); see also Thomas E. Baker, Prece-
dent Times Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687, 697 (1981) (asserting 
that "Congress simply could not add judges fast enough"). 
21 Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System, The Geographical Bounda-
ries of the Several judicial Circuits: Recommendations for Change, 62 F.R.D. 223 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter Hruska Commission]. 
22 Act of Oct. 13, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807 (1973); see also Baker, supra note 1, 
at 925 (suggesting why Congress established commission). See generally Arthur D. Hellman, Legal 
Problems of Dividing a State Between Federal judicial Circuits, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1188 (1974). 
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appeals courts' boundaries.23 The Hruska Commission was reluctant to 
disturb institutions that had gained their constituents' respect and loyalty 
after judges and attorneys eloquently testified to the sense of community 
that they enjoyed within the existing appellate boundaries.24 
The Commission based its recommendation that Congress divide the 
Fifth and Ninth Circuits on general criteria governing realignment which 
it had developed: (1) at least three states were needed to constitute a cir-
cuit; (2) appeals courts should not be established that would immediately 
require more than nine judges; (3) circuits ought to include states with 
diverse populations, legal business, and socio-economic profiles; (4) re-
alignment should not unduly interfere with existing appellate court 
boundaries; and (5) appeals courts should consist of contiguous states.211 
Congress split the Fifth Circuit because it was large in terms of geogra-
phy, population, caseload, and number of judges and because the court's 
active members unanimously favored division. 26 Creating two circuits, 
however, failed to relieve docket pressures. In less than a half-decade, the 
new Fifth Circuit had encountered the same crisis level of appeals that it 
had experienced before division.27 By 1989, the Eleventh Circuit's 
caseload justified adding more members, but the Circuit Judicial Council, 
out of concern that the court might grow too large, adopted a formal, 
unanimous resolution requesting that Congress not authorize additional 
judgeships.28 
•• See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 228. 
•• See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 228. 
•• See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 231-32. Cf. infra note 184 and accompanying text 
(affording criteria recently developed by the Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States in its Proposed Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts. 
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 927. 
27 See Speech by Gilbert Ganucheau, Fifth Circuit Appellate Advocacy Seminar (Oct. 18, 1984), 
reprinted in 2 Fifth Circuit Rep. 301 (1985); see also Chief Judge Charles Clark, Remarks at the 
1989 Judicial Conference of the Fifth and Eleventh Judicial Circuits in New Orleans, La. (May 8, 
1989), reprinted in pertinent part in Baker, supra note 1, at 928 n.55. 
•• See Chief Judge Paul H. Roney, Remarks at the 1989 Judicial Conference of the Fifth and 
Eleventh Judicial Circuits in New Orleans, La. (May 8, 1989); Letter from Chief Judge Paul H. 
Roney to Ralph Mecham, Director of the Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (Mar. 2, 1989); see 
also OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE OF THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, POSI-
TION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION 
Acr OF 1995 Oune 22, 1995), reprinted in 141 CoNG. REC. S10436 (daily ed. July 10, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Patty Murray) [hereinafter S. 956 POSITION PAPER) ("dividing the Fifth Circuit 
had no effect on the growth of the caseload"). 
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B. Earlier Proposals To Divide the Ninth Circuit and Ameliorative 
Efforts 
There have been numerous proposals to divide the Ninth Circuit since 
before World War II.29 Therefore, the Hruska Commission's suggestion 
that Congress split the circuit was anticipated, although its recommenda-
tion that California be divided and that one state's district courts be reas-
signed to different circuits was surprising.30 The Commission's proposal 
to split California proved highly controversial, and delayed serious con-
gressional consideration of the appeals court's division during 1973. Con-
gress was no more responsive to circuit-splitting legislation that was intro-
duced a decade later. 31 
In 1978, Congress empowered those circuits with more than fifteen ac-
tive judges to reorganize their courts with administrative units and to 
adopt streamlined procedures for en bane hearings. 32 The Ninth Circuit 
responded to this congressional authorization in a number of creative 
ways. For example, the court restructured itself into three units to achieve 
more efficient and decentralized administration33 and adopted a circuit 
rule prescribing a limited en bane mechanism, under which the chief 
:iudge and ten active judges selected by lot would sit en bane to rehear 
appeals on a majority vote of all active judges.34 
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 928; S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 2; see also 
OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE OF THE U.S. COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, POSITION 
PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 1686 NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT 
(Aug. 2, 1991} [hereinafter S. 1686 POSITION PAPER) (affording additional historical background). 
30 See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 235. See generally Hellman, supra note 22. 
31 See S. 1156, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); Circuit Breaker-Move on to Split the Ninth, 70 
A.B.A. J. 34, 34 (1984). See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 928. 
32 Any court of appeals having more than 15 active judges may constitute itself into admin-
istrative units complete with such facilities and staff as may be prescribed by the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States Courts, and may perform its en bane function by such 
number of members of its en bane courts as may be prescribed by rule of the court of 
appeals. 
Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633, supplemented by Act of Oct. 15, 
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458, 94 Stat. 2035 (1981). 
33 See Baker, supra note 1, at 929. See generally OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE UNITED 
STATES COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, S. 948 NINTH CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS REORGANI-
ZATION ACT 6-7 (1989) [hereinafter s. 948 POSITION PAPER); JOSEPH CECIL, ADMINISTRATION OF 
JUSTICE IN A LARGE APPELLATE COURT: THE NINTH CIRCUIT INNOVATIONS PROJECT (Federal 
Judicial Center 1985). 
34 See 9TH Cm. R. 35-3 (formerly Rule 25). See generally PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., 
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 161-63, 200-03 (1976); Steven Bennett & Christine Pembroke, "Mini" In Banc 
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Ninth Circuit judges have increased their output, and the circuit has 
implemented numerous internal measures. Illustrative reforms include 
prebriefing conferences which help to narrow issues for appeal, limit the 
size of briefs, and explore the possibilities for settlement.35 Circuit support 
staff have increased their efficiency, while the court has been an acknowl-
edged leader in employing technological advances.36 During the late 
1980s, the Ninth Circuit reported to Congress that the court's experi-
ments had enabled it to manage a substantial caseload effectively, that 
there was no reason to split the circuit, and that the procedures adopted 
even provided for continued growth in the circuit. 37 
C. Analysis oj Senate Bill 948 
Senate Bill 948, which Congress seriously examined in 1990, warrants 
relatively thorough analysis here because the proposed legislation and the 
principal reasons enunciated on its behalf closely resemble Senate Bill 956 
and the arguments articulated for it. Indeed, these striking similarities and 
the lack of changes in the subsequent five years are critical to the new 
proposal's consideration. 
Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 531 (1986); Report of the Ameri-
can Bar Association Standing Committee on Federal Judicial Improvements, The United States 
Courts of Appeals: Reexamining Structure and Process After a Century of Growth, reprinted in 125 
F.R.D. 523, 542-44 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Report). 
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 932; John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth 
Circuit's Experience in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 859, see 
also JAMES B. EAGLIN, THE PRE-ARGUMENT CONFERENCE PROGRAM IN THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
COURT OF APPEALS (Federal Judicial Center 1990) (analyzing analogous experimentation in Sixth 
Circuit). See generally S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 6-7; CECIL, supra note 33, at 79-
95. 
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 932; Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts: The 
Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REV. 937 (1980); see also S. 956 POSITION PAPER, 
supra note 28, at 3-4 (asserting that Ninth Circuit has served as laboratory for experimentation in 
host of areas). See generally Cathy Catterson, The Changing Ninth Circuit, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 173 
(1989); Stephen L. Washy, Technology and Communication in a Federal Court: The Ninth Circuit, 
28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 (1988). 
37 THE JUDICIAL COUNCIL AND UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIR-
CUIT, FOURTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SECTION 6 OF THE 
OMNIBUS JUDGESHIPS ACT OF 1978 AND OTHER MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE ADMINISTRATION OF 
JusTICE IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT 1 Uuly 1989) [hereinafter FOURTH BIENNIAL REPORT TO CON-
GRESS). See generally S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 6-7. Indeed, the circuit's experimen-
tation has been so successful that numerous other appeals courts have conducted similar experimenta-
tion. See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 4. See generally infra notes 201, 262-71 and 
accompanying text. 
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Professor Thomas Baker characterized S. 948 as the "most credible ef-
fort" to split the Ninth Circuit ever undertaken because eight Senators, 
representing the states affected by the proposed split, had co-sponsored the 
legislation.38 Moreover, the United States Department of Justice endorsed 
the bill in a surprising reversal of the official "no position" approach that 
it had previously assumed.39 
In March of 1990, the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and 
Administrative Practice conducted a hearing in which numerous propo-
nents and critics of S. 948 afforded voluminous, well-considered testi-
mony .40 Four senators from affected states officially opposed splitting the 
Ninth Circuit.41 Senator Dennis DeConcini (D-Ariz.) was in this group, 
and he was the only member of the Judiciary Committee to testify against 
division during the hearing. 42 
At the 1989 meeting of the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference, it went 
on record to recommend that Congress reject all proposals to split the 
court, and the vast majority of the circuit's active judges opposed divi-
sion.43 Moreover, Senate Bill 948's advocates apparently failed to per-
suade Congress to redraw the court's boundaries, while the legislation's 
critics seemed to refute convincingly the arguments of the bill's 
champions.44 
The Senate Judiciary Committee eventually decided against sending the 
circuit-splitting bill to the floor in 1990.45 The most important reasons for 
38 See Baker, supra note 1, at 933; see also 135 CoNG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) 
(providing statements of introduction by original sponsors). 
38 See Letter from Bruce C. Navarro, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Department of Justice, 
to Sen. Howell Heflin, Chairman, Subcomm. on Courts and Admin. Practice, Comm. on the Judici-
ary 5 (Mar. 6, 1990), reprinted in S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 571 [hereinafter Navarro 
Letter]. 
•
0 See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4. 
n See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 280-83, 288-89, 290, 286-87 (statements of Senators 
Alan Cranston, Dennis DeConcini, Daniel K. Inouye, and Pete Wilson). 
•• See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 288-89 (statement of Sen. DeConcini). 
•• See S. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note 29, at 2; see also infra note 75. See generally S. 956 
POSITION p APER, supra note 28, at 3. 
•• See, e.g., S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4; S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33. See gener-
ally Baker, supra note 1, at 934 . 
•• Sees. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 2; s. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note 29, at 
8-9. See generally Steve Albert, Congress Weighs Plan to Divide the Ninth Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, 
Feb. 1, 1993, at 12. 
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and against the measure deserve analysis. Those rationales will frame the 
revived debate over the appeals court's division. Most of the relevant is-
sues received full consideration five years ago, but the recent proposal ap-
pears more likely to pass primarily because of Congress's changed 
composition. 
1. Major Arguments For and Against Senate Bill 948 and 
Responses 
a. Size 
Numerous advocates of S. 948 suggested that the sheer size of the Ninth 
Circuit created difficulties.46 These concerns implicated geographic magni-
tude, the travel and concomitant expense required, the population base 
served, the number of judgeships, the circuit's caseload and corresponding 
time for processing appeals, and the costs of operating the appellate 
court.47 
The Ninth Circuit encompasses nine states and two territories contain-
ing some fourteen million square miles.48 The court's travel expenses were 
the largest in the federal system, and the distances that attorneys and liti-
gants had to travel and the concomitant costs which they incurred were 
quite significant.49 It is important to understand that the circuit which 
includes Alaska will be enormous. Moreover, each of the appellate courts 
proposed in Senate Bill 948 would have been large. For example, Alaska, 
Idaho, and Montana counsel in the new Twelfth Circuit would have had 
to travel for oral argument to Portland or Seattle, the same cities to which 
the lawyers previously travelled. Furthermore, a single circuit which 
serves a "large geographic region promotes uniformity and consistency in 
the law and facilitates trade and commerce by contributing to stability and 
orderly progress. "110 
•• I rely substantially in this subsection on the testimony and other statements of S. 948's advo-
cates and opponents. 
47 For helpful overviews of the issues that size implicates, see Baker, supra note 1, at 934-38; S. 
956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 3-5. 
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 935. 
•• See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 558 (statement of Mark C. Rutzick). See generally 
Baker, supra note 1, at 935. 
00 Sees. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 3; s. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note 29, at 
2; S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 6. The quotation in the text appears in the 1995 
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When the Senate considered S. 948 in 1990, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals served a population of nearly forty-four million individu-
als151-fifteen million more persons than lived in the Sixth Circuit, the 
second largest-and approximately twenty million more people than in 
any of the remaining appellate courts.152 The Ninth Circuit, accordingly, 
served approximately sixteen percent of the country's population, which 
was similar to the population of the Eighth Circuit when Congress di-
vided it in 1929.153 Any appeals court which encompasses California, how-
ever, will have a substantial population base. 
In 1990, Congress had allocated to the Ninth Circuit twenty-eight ac-
tive judges, which surpasses by twelve the second largest appellate court, 
the Fifth Circuit. This figure is sixteen more than the average judicial 
complement in the other appeals courts.154 Senator Slade Gorton (R-
Wash.), who has led the recent efforts to split the Ninth Circuit, estimated 
that the standard caseload formula would have justified ten additional 
judges five years ago.1515 
The significant number of judges authorized to sit on the appellate 
bench has numerous benefits. For instance, the "court of appeals is 
strengthened and enriched, and the inevitable tendency to regional paro-
chialism is weakened, by the variety and diversity of backgrounds of its 
judges drawn from the nine states comprising the circuit."156 The Ninth 
Circuit's substantial membership has given the circuit and district courts 
considerable flexibility in assigning judges who are able to respond to spe-
cial concerns, such as sharp filing increases by specific case types or in 
particular districts.157 
position paper. However, virtually identical language appears in the 1991 and 1989 position papers. 
When this situation obtains, I shall rely on the most recent version and cite to the less recent ones. 
01 See Navarro Letter, supra note 39, at 4. See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 935. 
•• See Navarro Letter, supra note 39, at 4. See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 935. 
03 See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 557 (statement of Mark C. Rutzick). 
0
' See Baker, supra note 1, at 935. 
00 See Position Paper of Sen. Slade Gorton on the "Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1989" (S. 948) 2 (Mar. 6, 1990), reprinted in S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 18 
(hereinafter Gorton Position Paper]. 
oe See s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 3. Accord s. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra 
note 29, at 3; S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 4-5; Albert, supra note 45, at 13 (quoting 
former Chief Judge James Browning's assertion that court's diversity is an asset}. 
01 Sees. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 3; s. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 
5. 
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In the late 1980s, the Ninth Circuit's docket of over 6000 appeals was 
fifty percent greater than the appellate court with the second largest num-
ber of filings. The Ninth Circuit accounted for fifteen percent of all ap-
peals filed in the twelve regional circuits.118 If the Ninth Circuit's caseload 
continued to grow at the 1990 rate, the number of appeals that litigants 
docketed in 1980 would double before the year 2000.119 
During 1990, even with three unfilled seats, the Ninth Circuit kept its 
calendar current. This meant that the court scheduled all fully briefed 
appeals for oral argument on the subsequent argument calendar.60 The 
maintenance of a current calendar should not be determinative, however. 
For instance, some observers have asserted that the increasing number and 
complexity of cases intuitively suggest that circuit division would facilitate 
the efforts of judges and lawyers to master the court's substantive law.61 
Senator Conrad Burns (R-Mt.) observed that the Ninth Circuit re-
quired a median time of fourteen and one-half months to process an ap-
peal, the longest in the country.62 Only a small percentage of that time, 
however, was spent in judges' chambers, from submission to disposition: 
2.5 months for orally argued cases and 0. 9 months for submitted cases, 
numbers which are lower than the national average.63 Court reporters and 
counsel consumed the rest of the fourteen and one-half months preparing 
the record and briefing. Nonetheless, Professor Baker found the 14.5 
months statistic problematic because half of the appeals required more 
than two years. 64 Even so, he warned that practicing lawyers were expres-
sing little concern about delay, and that splitting the Ninth Circuit would 
have absolutely no impact on the aggregate workload. 611 
•
9 See Navarro Letter, supra note 39, at 4. 
•• See Baker, supra note 1, at 936. 
80 See s. 948 POSITION p APER, supra note 33, at 3. 
81 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1, at 936; Gorton Position Paper, supra note 55, at 3. 
•• 135 CONG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Burns); see also Gorton 
Position Paper, supra note 55, at 3 (15.3 months as of June 3, 1989). 
•• See S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 9-10; see also infra text accompanying note 
127 (suggesting improvement since 1990) . 
.. Baker, supra note 1, at 937. 
•• Baker, supra note 1, at 937. Accord S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 288 (DeConcini State-
ment) (asserting that practitioners do not complain); S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 481-83 (state-
ment of James W. O'Brien) (asserting that division would not affect aggregate workload); see also 
Thomas E. Baker & Denis J. Hauptly, Taking Another Measure of the "Crisis of Volume" in the 
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Expense is another parameter that implicates size. During 1988, the 
Ninth Circuit's expenditures were twenty-five million dollars, which con-
stituted approximately twenty percent of the total cost of the whole appel-
late system.66 In 1990, the initial estimated expense of creating the new 
Twelfth Circuit was "$5.3 million in start-up costs and $2.5 million an-
nually in current dollars."67 Logic and prior experience with federal gov-
ernment programs prompted several respected observers to question 
whether the new Ninth and Twelfth Circuits would actually yield greater 
cost efficiency and net savings.68 
During 1990, Professor Baker remarked that debate over the Ninth 
Circuit's size was not always placed in context, while he afforded several 
illustrations which do so.69 For example, the appeals court had more 
judges than the complete federal appellate bench and almost twice the 
national docket in 1939.70 He concluded that the Ninth Circuit's problem 
was workload, not size, and that any measure, which like Senate Bill 948, 
kept Arizona and California in the same circuit could only promise a "few 
speculative and marginal gains."71 
b. Consistency 
Avid proponents of S. 948, such as Senator Mark Hatfield (R-Or.), 
expressed much concern about the growi~g inconsistency in the Ninth 
Circuit, offering the "increased likelihood of intracircuit conflicts" as an 
important justification for splitting the court.72 The statistical opportuni-
ties for inconsistency on a twenty-eight judge court are substantial; for 
instance, 3,276 combinations of panels could resolve an issue.73 During 
1990, S. 948's advocates and Ninth Circuit judges, practitioners, and state 
U.S. Courts of Appeals, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 97 (1994) (affording valuable additional treatment 
of delay and workload). 
68 See Gorton Position Paper, supra note 55, at 4; see also infra note 144. 
67 s. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 12. 
88 See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 442 (statement of Chief Judge Barbara J. Rothstein) 
(asserting that cost "is certain to be exorbitant"); Baker, supra note 1, at 937. 
•• Baker, supra note 1, at 938. 
70 Baker, supra note 1, at 938. 
71 Baker, supra note 1, at 938. 
72 135 CONG. REC. $5026 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Gorton) [hereinafter 1989 
Gorton Statement]; 135 Cong. Rec. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatfield). 
73 See Baker, supra note 1, at 938. 
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bar associations in jurisdictions in the proposed Twelfth Circuit appar-
ently disagreed about the issue of conflicts and about premising division 
on inconsistency.74 The vast majority of active Ninth Circuit judges and 
state bar associations found these conflicts insufficiently problematic to 
justify supporting the legislation,75 while the Circuit Executive Office and 
other students of the court persuasively repudiated the notion that the 
threat of inconsistency posed serious difficulties.76 
In 1990, the Ninth Circuit probably had instituted more measures than 
any other circuit to address these conflicts.77 For example, Ninth Circuit 
staff" attorneys fully reviewed every case and coded into a computer the 
issues for consideration.78 The court then assigned to the identical three-
judge panels the appeals that raised similar issues and were ready for 
calendaring at the same time. Using a limited en bane mechanism to re-
solve intracircuit inconsistencies concomitantly proved very efficacious.79 
The author of a 1989 study concluded, partly on the basis of these im-
provements, that the conflicts were less problematic than many attorneys 
thought and certainly less than S. 948's sponsors contended.80 
The proponents of division project that it will enable judges, lawyers, 
and parties to master the more limited and predictable universe of rele-
74 Compare 135 CoNG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) with S. 
948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 8. See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 939 n.112 (citing 
NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL COUNCIL, SURVEY OF DISTRICT JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS REGARDING 
THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 19 (1987)). 
1
• During the 1989 Judicial Conference of the Ninth Circuit Courts, all judges and lawyer 
representatives who were in attendance voted by secret ballot on S. 948, and 90% opposed the mea-
sure, while 69 of 79 lawyers opposed it. The Bar Associations of Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Montana, Nevada, and the Northern Mariana Islands opposed S. 948. See Baker, supra note 1, at 
939 n.114. 
76 See S. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 8-9; see also Baker, supra note 1, at 938-50; 
Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of Precedent in the 
Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541 (1989). 
77 Sees. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 6-7; see also s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra 
note 28, at 3-4; s. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note 29, at 3-4. 
76 I rely substantially in this sentence and the next on Hellman, supra note 36, at 945. See 
generally Baker, supra note 1, at 939 n.116 (citing UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE 
NINTH CIRCUIT GENERAL ORDERS 4.1 (1987)). 
79 See, e.g., s. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 6; s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 
28, at 3; Baker, supra note 1, at 939-40. 
•• See Hellman, supra note 76, at 544. Accord Arthur D. Hellman, Breaking the Banc: The 
Common-Law Process in the Large Appellate Court, 23 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 915, 921 (1991). 
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vant case law.81 Insofar as debate over inconsistency involves the amount 
of Ninth Circuit precedent, a phenomenon which enhances panels' ability 
to apply precedent selectively, this is a national development that is only 
marginally more applicable in larger appellate courts with greater case 
law.82 Splitting the Ninth Circuit, therefore, would not eliminate the 
problem.83 
Finally, although splitting the Ninth Circuit might reduce conflicts 
within the two new appeals courts, it would also foster intercircuit incon-
sistency, thereby increasing the burden on the Supreme Court to resolve 
conflicts. 84 More specifically, attorneys have "expressed particular concern 
that dividing the extended coastline in the West between two circuits 
would create inconsistent and conflicting application of maritime, com-
mercial, and utility law in the two circuits, making commerce more diffi-
cult and costly, and requiring them to research the law of two circuits for 
every potential cross-circuit transaction."85 
c. California and the Northwest 
Some strong champions of S. 948 constructed several arguments from a 
northwestern regional perspective, which manifested varying degrees of 
hostility toward California. For example, Senator Gorton contended that 
litigants in the Pacific Northwest are "simply dominated by California 
judges and California attitudes,"86 while Senator Burns argued that resi-
dents of states like Montana should not have their appeals delayed be-
cause California "continues to experience an economic and population 
boom."87 Senator Hatfield pointed out that creation of the Twelfth Circuit 
81 See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 448 (statement of Chief Judge Owen M. Panner). 
82 See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 448 (statement of Chief Judge Owen M. Panner). See 
generally Baker, supra note 1, at 940. 
83 See Hellman, supra note 76, at 597-601. 
"' See S. 948 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 33, at 3; S. 1686 PosITION PAPER, supra note 29, at 
5. With Justice Byron White's retirement, the Supreme Court seems less concerned about intercircuit 
inconsistency as the Court's shrunken docket affords it more time to resolve conflicts. 
80 S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 28, at 3. Accord S. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note 
29, at 2-3. "Potential inconsistencies would be especially troubling in the application of utility rates 
along the entire Pacific seaboard by the Bonneville Power Administration. These rate and administra-
tive disputes should remain in a single service area, the Ninth Circuit." S. 956 PosrrION PAPER, 
supra note 28, at 3. 
88 135 CONG. REC. 55026 (daily ed. May 9, 1989). 
87 135 CONG. REC. 55028 (daily ed. May 9, 1989). 
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would honor Congress's original intent in drawing appellate court bound-
aries: the establishment of circuits which reflected a regional identity by 
combining a "small set of contiguous states that shared a common 
background. "88 
Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington do resemble one an-
other more than California, but the five states differ in certain respects. 
For instance, Alaska's climate and size and the peculiar manner in which 
its huge mass of real property is owned may make that state very unusual, 
if not sui generis. Idaho and Montana, as landlocked jurisdictions in the 
intermountain West, are comparatively untouched by numerous concerns 
that are important to the three coastal states. 
It is inconceivable that Congress added Hawaii, Guam, and the North-
ern Mariana Islands to the Ninth Circuit to give the court a regional 
identity as part of a "small set of contiguous states that shared a common 
background."89 After all, Hawaii and the two territories have diverse his-
tories, populations, and local legal and nonlegal cultures, and are located 
thousands of miles from the mainland. Moreover, premising the creation 
of an appeals court today on the aspiration to honor original congressional 
intent in drawing the appellate system's boundaries may be 
anachronistic. 90 
Professor Baker challenged the "sponsors' underlying premise that Cal-
ifornia judges are idiosyncratic and monolithic."91 He suggested that com-
puterized, rnndom selection of Ninth Circuit panels and a study of the 
judges' philosophies rendered these stereotypes untenable.92 To the extent 
that regional factors might apply in specific lawsuits, district judges can 
arguably consider them.93 At the appellate level, the geographical locales 
88 See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 253 (statement of Sen. Hatfield). 
89 See supra text accompanying note 88. 
80 See supra text accompanying note 88. 
91 Baker, supra note 1, at 941. 
92 See S. 948 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 33, at 9 (analyzing panel selection); Baker, supra 
note 1, at 941 (analyzing stereotyping); see also Daniel Trigoboff, Northwest Favors Splitting "Cali-
fornia" Circuit, LEGAL TIMES, June 12, 1989, at 2 (suggesting that former Chief Judge Browning 
challenged bifurcation's advocates to produce study documenting geographic correlation of Ninth Cir-
cuit rulings). When S. 948's sponsors introduced the measure in 1989, a bare majority of active judges 
on the court listed their duty stations as California. Indeed, only four of ten judges whom President 
Ronald Reagan appointed were so listed. 
93 See Baker, supra note 1, at 942 (citing S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 692 (statement of 
Eric Redman)). 
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in which judges sit should be irrelevant. Circuits have an important re-
sponsibility to federalize the law; that is, to harmonize local and state 
policy concerns with national policy and the Constitution. 94 
Indeed, when commenting on Senate Bill 948, former Chief Justice 
Warren Burger described as "very offensive [the notion] that a U.S. judge, 
having taken an oath of office is going to be biased because of the eco-
nomic conditions of his own jurisdiction."95 In short, local prejudice of-
fends the very idea of an appellate court, while federal law's balkanization 
conflicts with principles of federalism.96 
2. Miscellaneous Arguments 
a. State Law Mastery 
Senator Robert Packwood (R-Or.) claimed that S. 948's division of the 
Ninth Circuit would enable judges and their law clerks to achieve even 
greater mastery of applicable state law than the substantial expertise 
which they displayed in 1990.97 Relevant statistical information blunts the 
force of this contention. In 1990, the appellate court entertained more 
than 5800 appeals that involved federal question jurisdiction and decided 
some 250 diversity cases, three-quarters of which sustained district court 
determinations. 98 
b. Reduction of the Reversal Rate 
Senator Packwood also argued that splitting the Ninth Circuit might 
reduce the frequency with which the Supreme Court overturned its deci-
sions.99 As a preliminary matter, it seems that little significance should 
.,. See John Minor Wisdom, Requiem for a Great Court, 26 LOY. L. REV. 787, 788 {1980). 
9
• See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 469 (statement of former Chief Justice Warren Burger); 
see also Trigoboff, supra note 92, at 2 (quoting Judges Browning and Alex Kozinski to similar 
effect). See generally S. 1686 POSITION PAPER, supra note 29, at 6. 
98 See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 286 (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson); Baker, supra note 
1, at 942-43; ABA Appellate Practice Committee, Subcommittee to Study Circuit Size, Report 3 
(1992). See generally S. 956 PosmoN PAPER, supra note 28, at 6-7. 
97 135 CONG. REC. S5027 {daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Packwood). Professor 
Baker observed that the existing "high level of expertise" did not seem inadequate. Baker, supra note 
1, at 943. 
98 See s. 948 POSITION p APER, supra note 33, at 10. 
99 135 CONG. REC. S5027 (daily ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Packwood); see also S. 
948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 449 {statement of Chief Judge Owen M. Panner). 
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attach to a particular circuit's reversal rate. Even if the frequency of re-
versal were considered more important as a theoretical proposition, the 
rate is influenced by so many variables, such as cases which litigants 
choose to appeal and on which the Supreme Court chooses to grant certio-
rari, and fluctuates so substantially from year to year, that the concept 
lacks much practical value.100 Moreover, splitting the former Fifth Circuit 
minimally influenced the number of cases which the Supreme Court re-
viewed from the two new appellate courts.101 
3. A Word About Politics 
Certain ideas articulated in support of and against the Ninth Circuit's 
division and some express statements of S. 948's sponsors indicate that the 
underlying political objective of changing the court's substantive law 
partly motivated the bill's proponents.102 Illustrative is the argument re-
garding California and the northwest states explored above.103 Senator 
Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) dubbed the endeavor "environmental gerrymander-
ing."104 Former Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alfred Goodwin similarly ob-
served that the measure's advocates, who represented "states heavily in-
volved in federal timber distribution ... [were] unhappy with the way the 
[environmental] laws were implemented" by the court, and this made the 
1989 congressional effort "more blatantly political."10G 
The Ninth Circuit judges who opposed splitting the court may also 
have been animated by politics, albeit of a different type.106 For example, 
Chief Judge Goodwin apparently felt compelled to say that he no longer 
believed it "appropriate to discuss the motivation" of the legislation's 
100 In the October 1986 Tenn, the "Ninth Circuit ranked tenth among the twelve circuits in 
reversal rate." S. 948 PosITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 10. In the October 1993 Term, however, 
the Supreme Court reversed ten cases from the Ninth Circuit, five from the Fifth Circuit, and only 
one or two from each of the remaining circuits. See Preview of U.S. Supreme Court Cases, July 7, 
1995, at 7J. See generally Richard G. Wilkins et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1993 Term, 
22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 269 (1995). 
101 See Baker, supra note 1, at 943-44. 
102 For a helpful overview of the politics in 1989 and 1990, see Baker, supra note 1, at 944-45. 
10
• See supra notes 86-96 and accompanying text. 
"'' See S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 286 (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson). 
10
• Trigoboff, supra note 92, at 2 (quoting former Chief Judge Alfred Goodwin). 
10
• See Baker, supra note 1, at 944-45. 
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champions.107 Senator Gorton proclaimed that "as expected, this bill has 
been taken personally by the Ninth Circuit hierarchy-God bless their 
souls-who has set out to defeat this bill and protect their power base."108 
4. S. 948's Resolution and a Glance at More Recent Developments 
Several factors alone and synergistically may have prompted Congress 
to reject S. 948 and to leave the Ninth Circuit undisturbed in 1990. The 
resistance of the appeals court's members, the opposition of a few senators 
from affected states, and of environmental organizations, such as the Si-
erra Club, and the suggestion of the Federal Courts Study Committee that 
Congress authorize a five-year study of the circuits apparently explain the 
measure's tepid congressional reception.109 
Numerous developments that are relevant to the Ninth Circuit's divi-
sion have transpired since 1990. Senators and representatives who favored 
bifurcating the court sponsored measures similar to S. 948 in 1991 and 
1993.11° Congress did not seriously consider the proposed legislation as 
witnessed 'by its failure to schedule hearings. Congress also failed to au-
thorize an official study specifically focusing on appellate court caseloads 
and structural remedies for addressing them, as recommended by the 
Study Committee.111 
The Federal Judicial Center (FJC) did complete a 1993 study of struc-
tural alternatives at the instigation of the Committee and Congress.112 
The F JC found little evidence to suggest that intracircuit inconsistency is 
an important difficulty or that conflicts strongly correlate with circuit 
107 Neil A. Lewis, The Ninth Circuit: Northwest v. California, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1990, at 
B6. 
10
• Gorton Position Paper, supra note 55, at 5; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Participation, Public 
Law and Venue Reform, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 976, 997-1000 (1982) (warning of the risks of attempt-
ing to modify federal courts for political purposes). 
10
• See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (1990) [hereinafter FEDERAL 
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT]. The Committee was an independent entity that Congress 
authorized to study the federal courts and make recommendations for improving them. See Federal 
Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, §§ 101-09, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644 (1988). 
110 See S. 1686, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. 3654, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
111 See supra text accompanying note 109. 
112 JUDITH A. MCKENNA, STRUCTURAL AND OTHER ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL 
COURTS OF APPEALS (Federal Judicial Center 1993). 
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size.113 Moreover, the Center determined that the appellate system was 
encountering stress that structural changes would not "significantly 
relieve. " 114 
The Long Range Planning Committee of the Judicial Conference un-
dertook a comparatively broad evaluation of the federal courts and pub-
lished a final report in March 199 5.1115 The Committee expressed its op-
position to circuit restructuring and explored the possibilities of assigning 
district judges additional appellate duties and reducing the size of appeals 
court panels.116 
In short, Senate Bill 956 has a rich and interesting background which 
apparently underlies the measure's introduction by most of the senators 
who represent the Pacific Northwest. Much of that proposed legislation's 
origins and development and a number of the issues that remain salient 
today can be traced to Congress's consideration of Senate Bill 948 five 
years ago. The recent measure is examined in the following section of this 
Article. 
II. ANALYSIS OF SENATE BILL 956 
Many particulars of Senate Bill 956 and the reasons given for its intro-
duction are analogous to the provisions of S. 948 and the rationales that 
supported it. Indeed, the new bill makes only two substantive modifica-
tions in the proposal that Congress explored five years earlier. It is impor-
tant, nonetheless, to evaluate the requirements that sponsors have included 
in Senate Bill 956, the arguments which advocates have enunciated to 
substantiate that measure, and additional ideas in favor of and against the 
proposal, especially by emphasizing those concepts which are new or have 
changed during the 1990s. 
11
• Id. at 94. 
m Id. at 155. 
11
• COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES, PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS {1995) (hereinafter LONG 
RANGE PLAN). 
116 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 42, 123-24. 
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A. Descriptive Analysis of Senate Bill 956 
Senate Bill 956 leaves intact nearly everything that the sponsors in-
cluded in S. 948. Provisions governing where the circuit courts sit, the 
assignment of active appeals court judges and senior judges' election of 
assignment, judicial seniority, as well as the legislation's application to 
cases and its effective date, definitions, and administration are either iden-
tical or quite similar.117 
The principal substantive alterations govern the jurisdictions that would 
be included in, and the number of circuit judges who would be authorized 
for, the Ninth and Twelfth Circuits. Senate Bill 956 differs from Senate 
Bill 948 in leaving Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in 
the new Ninth Circuit, and in originally prescribing seven, rather than 
nine, judges for the new Twelfth Circuit.118 
B. Proponents' Arguments for Senate Bill 956 
In- introducing the legislation, the supporters of Senate Bill 956 re-
peated the three major ideas-size, consistency, and the relationship be-
tween California and the Northwest-which proponents had espoused in 
support of Senate Bill 948.119 For instance, Senator Gorton stated that the 
"Ninth Circuit is by far the largest of the thirteen judicial circuits, mea-
sured both by number of judges and by caseload ... [and] the deplorable 
consequence of the massive size of this circuit is a marked decrease in the 
consistency of justice provided by Ninth Circuit courts."120 He also said 
that California is responsible for fifty-five percent of the appellate court's 
filings, which means that "California judges and California judicial phi-
losophy" dominate parties in the Pacific Northwest states appealing issues 
that are "fundamentally unique" to the region.121 
Senator Burns, an original co-sponsor of the new legislation, echoed 
these sentiments. He reiterated that the "Ninth Circuit is by far the larg-
117 Compare S. 948, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2-3 (1989) with S. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 
§§ 2-3 (1995}. 
118 Compare S. 948 with S. 956 and S. 853, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995}. 
119 See supra notes 46-96 and accompanying text. 
120 141 CONG. REC. S7504 (daily ed. May 25, 1995} (statement of Sen. Gorton) (hereinafter 
1995 Gorton statement). . 
121 1995 Gorton statement, supra note 120, at S7504. 
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est of all the circuit courts, both in terms of the number of judges and 
caseload," and that appeals remain "pending in the Ninth Circuit for an 
average of 14;.2 months."122 Senator Burns suggested that it was neither 
fair nor in the justice system's best interest for Montana citizens and busi-
nesses to suffer because of California's continuing population and eco-
nomic explosion. He' alleged that he now detected bias against inland 
states in the federal judiciary as well as in the legislative and executive 
branches. 123 
Senate Bill 956's advocates articulated several propositions which are 
new or represent variations on the above themes. Senator Gorton observed 
that the Ninth Circuit had an "astounding 8092 new filings, almost 2000 
more than the next busiest circuit" in 1994.124 He also asserted that the 
appellate court is currently the "slowest of twelve regional circuits in 
hearing and deciding appeals, on average taking a full sixteen months," 
and that the "number of pending cases swelled by almost twenty percent 
in the last year."125 Senator Burns commented that the appellate court 
had 6342 appeals pending in 1988 and 7597 in 1993, an increase of 
nearly twenty percent, 126 but this information apparently adds little to the 
material which Senator Gorton supplied.127 
The large number of new filings is commensurate with increases in 
several other circuits, while the figure of nearly "2000 more than the next 
busiest circuit" actually constitutes a modest improvement. For instance, 
when Senator Gorton introduced Senate Bill 948 in 1989, he remarked 
that "the Ninth Circuit handle[d] 2003 more cases than any other cir-
cuit," considering 6334 appeals the preceding year.128 The court does have 
the country's largest docket in absolute terms, but the caseload level is not 
excessive when compared to other circuits.129 
122 141 CONG. REC. $7505 {daily ed. May 25, 1995) {statement of Sen. Burns) [hereinafter 
Burns statement]. 
123 Burns statement, supra note 122, at $7506. 
124 1995 Gorton statement, supra note 120, at $7504. 
12
• 1995 Gorton statement, supra note 120, at $7504. 
12
• Burns statement, supra note 122, at $7505. 
127 See supra text accompanying notes 124-25. 
12
• 1995 Gorton statement, supra note 120, at $5026. 
129 In 1994, the Ninth Circuit stood at 868 appeals filed per panel, very close to the median 
of 832 and substantially below the numbers for the two circuits that emerged from the split 
of the Fifth Circuit in 1980 .... Caseload levels may also be measured by case termina-
tions per judge. The current Ninth Circuit rate of merit case terminations per judge is 
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The statistics regarding the average time required to process appeals 
and the number of pending appeals are more troubling. It is worth ob-
serving, however, that the additional one and a half months of processing 
time is relatively small, both figures can fluctuate, and the court lacked a 
full complement of active judges during the re!evant period. Moreover, the 
"average time from oral argument submission to disposition-that is, the 
actual time the judges have the cases in their hands-is 1.9 months, or .5 
months less than the national average."130 
Senator Burns was troubled to "see convicted murderers bringing law-
suits against the State claiming cruel and unusual punishment because 
they've been sitting on death row for a number of years."131 The Senator 
cited the example of a Montana prisoner who evaded execution for two 
decades by pursuing three Ninth Circuit appeals, while he ascribed the 
delay in securing justice for the victim's family pan;ly to the court's over-
loaded docket and its attendant inefficiencies.132 The Ninth Circuit has 
instituted measures that are intended to reduce the number of similar suits 
and to expedite review of cases filed. 133 Congress is currently considering 
legislation to limit the number of analogous filings and to resolve expedi-
tiously the cases that are pursued.134 
Senator Burns also claimed that the appellate court's division would 
"bring much needed caseload relief to the Ninth Circuit while providing 
overall relief to states like my own Montana."135 These contentions are 
superficially plausible, but scrutiny reveals that these assertions leave con-
siderable relevant information unsaid. The statements deserve close analy-
sis and emphasis because they apparently typify important justifications 
for Senate Bill 956 and for the practice of circuit-splitting. 
text. 
446, a number which is exactly the national median. See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra. 
note 28, at 5-6. 
m S. 956 PosTION PAPER, supra note 28, at 7; see also supra notes 62-65 and accompanying 
131 Burns statement, supra note 122, at S7505. 
182 See supra note 122, at 87505-06. 
188 See NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL COUNCIL, 1994 NINTH CIRCUIT CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 
HANDBOOK (1994). See generally s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 4. 
184 S. 735, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995}; H.R. 729, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. {1995). 
180 Burns statement, supra note 122, at 57506. The ideas that follow apply both to the proposed 
Ninth Circuit and to the proposed Twelfth Circuit. 
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An example is the notion that the new Ninth Circuit and the proposed 
Twelfth Circuit will individually receive fewer filings in absolute terms 
than the present Ninth Circuit. This proposition is essentially a truism. It 
is indisputable that each new circuit would confront a smaller number of 
cases than the existing Ninth Circuit, but it will also have a reduced con-
tingent of active judges to decide them. Moreover, the two circuits com-
bined will have the identical complement of active judges, who are 
charged with resolving the same total number of appeals as the present 
Ninth Circuit. These factors mean that the new Ninth Circuit, and the 
regions served by the existing Ninth Circuit and the two proposed courts, 
will realize no net benefit. 
Senator Burns's specific allegation that the Ninth Circuit's bifurcation 
would "bring much needed caseload relief to the Ninth Circuit"136 is cor-
rect on one level, although this observation omits numerous applicable 
ideas. It is accurate that the new Ninth Circuit would receive fewer ap-
peals as an absolute matter than the current Ninth Circuit; however, this 
decrease would afford no true advantages and would actually be 
detrimental. 
Senate Bill 956, by assigning nineteen active judges to the proposed 
court, authorizes a ratio of three-judge panels to filings which is signifi-
cantly less favorable than the current Ninth Circuit ratio, and which 
would be substantially less beneficial than the ratio proposed for the new 
Twelfth Circuit. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit Executive Office recently de-
termined that the realignment proposed by S. 956 would "materially in-
crease the caseload of judges" in the new Ninth Circuit from 868 to 1014 
appeals per three-judge panel annually.137 
More striking is the sharp contrast between the 1000 filings per panel 
annually for which the new Ninth Circuit would be responsible and the 
645 appeals per year that judges on the proposed Twelfth Circuit would 
address.138 The statistics assume even greater significance because the new 
Ninth Circuit would confront a more complex and time-consuming docket 
than the present Ninth does or the proposed Twelfth Circuit would. 
These figures show that the new Ninth Circuit will secure no real 
138 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
137 s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 5, 6. 
188 s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 6. 
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caseload relief; however, it would face a comparatively large and compli-
cated docket. 
Senator Burns also did not mention that the composition of the Ninth 
Circuit proposed by Senate Bill 956 would complicate the court's future 
efforts to discharge all of its duties effectively, especially resolving appeals 
promptly, inexpensively, and fairly. Even Senator Burns acknowledged 
that the "caseload for the Ninth Circuit will remain high no matter what, 
due to the population dynamics in a State like California."139 
It warrants emphasizing that California alone will not constitute the 
new Ninth Circuit. In addition to California, the jurisdiction would in-
clude Arizona, whose already sizable population is steadily rising, and 
Nevada, which is the nation's fastest-growing state.14° California is re-
sponsible for a majority of the existing Ninth Circuit's filings, a substan-
tial percentage of which are complex. Arizona and Nevada generate a 
significant number of appeals, many of which are complicated. The pro-
posed Ninth Circuit's composition, accordingly, guarantees that over time 
it will have increasingly onerous obligations which are imposed by a large, 
rapidly expanding docket consisting of relatively complex filings.141 
l:p short, Senate Bill 956 would not alleviate, but would in fact exacer-
bate, the new Ninth Circuit's caseload situation. The proposed legislation 
would require the court to decide many more appeals per panel, a higher 
percentage of which are complicated and time-consuming, than either the 
current Ninth Circuit or the proposed Twelfth Circuit. This situation 
would probably worsen in the future. 
Senator Burns's particular claim that splitting the Ninth Circuit would 
afford "overall relief to states like my own Montana"142 is correct. His 
contention, nevertheless, ignores much pertinent material, especially re-
garding the way that the advantage would materialize. Some of this infor-
mation has already been analyzed and thus receives less detailed treatment 
here. 
139 See Burns statement, supra note 122, at 87506. 
uo See 8. 956, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1995). 
141 8. 956 would also place Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands in the new Ninth 
Circuit. Their inclusion will minimally affect the court's caseload, although the circuit and lawyers 
and parties who appeal cases from those districts will incur significant travel costs. 
"" See Burns statement, supra note 122, at 87506. 
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It is true that the jurisdictions in the new Twelfth Circuit would bene-
fit. Most significant, the data analyzed already show that S. 956's alloca-
tion of nine active judges to the proposed Twelfth Circuit would provide a 
far better ratio of three-judge panels to filings than that of the new Ninth 
Circuit and a ratio more advantageous than the present Ninth Circuit.143 
The three-judge panels of the proposed Twelfth Circuit would annually 
confront 645 cases, in marked contrast to those of the new Ninth Circuit, 
which would face 1014 appeals; the existing Ninth Circuit now decides 
868 cases. The proposed Twelfth Circuit would also have a docket which 
is less complex and which requires less time to resolve than both the pro-
posed and the current Ninth Circuit. 
In short, the Ninth Circuit's division will off er the states included in 
the proposed Twelfth Circuit and the court itself important immediate 
benefits, which should improve in the future. The circuit will address con-
siderably fewer appeals per panel, a smaller percentage of which are com-
paratively complicated and time-consuming than either the new or the 
present Ninth Circuit. It is critical to understand, however, that most of 
the gains accruing to the proposed Twelfth Circuit will be at the expense 
of the new Ninth Circuit. The region served by the existing Ninth Circuit 
and the two proposed circuits will derive no net advantage. 
The above examination indicates that the Ninth Circuit's bifurcation 
will give the new Twelfth Circuit considerable relief. Nevertheless, the 
benefits realized could be costly and will probably be delayed in the near 
term. There would be numerous start-up and permanent expenses, involv-
ing time, money, and energy, which would accompany any effort that is as 
ambitious as creating a new appellate court.144 
Illustrative are requirements that the proposed Twelfth Circuit devote 
time and money to establishing and maintaining Clerk of Court and Cir-
cuit Executive Offices, training employees to staff them, and training ad-
143 See supra text accompanying notes 137-38 . 
... s. 948 POSITION PAPER, supra note 33, at 12-13; s. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 
2-3. The Ninth Circuit Executive Office estimated the initi· 1 start-up costs of creating the new 
Twelfth Circuit to be approximately S37.44 million and the additional annual operating expenses of 
maintaining two circuits to be S5.19 million. See OFFICE OF THE CIRCUIT EXECUTIVE OF THE U.S. 
COURTS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, POSITION PAPER IN OPPOSITION TO S. 956-NINTH CIRCUIT 
COURT OF APPEALS REORGANIZATION ACT OF 1995, SUPPLEMENT 1 (Sept. 6, 1995). The discussion 
presented in the next four paragraphs relies heavily on the first two sources. 
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ministrative personnel to manage them. The Twelfth Circuit might be 
able to capitalize on the experience of creating the Eleventh Circuit. 
However, the Eleventh Circuit was established fifteen years ago; institu-
tional memories may have faded and that court differs significantly from 
the proposed Twelfth Circuit.145 
Complications apart from these fixed start.,up costs would attend any 
project of this magnitude. Once the proposed Twelfth Circuit exists and 
has overcome the basic problems involving its institution, it will encounter 
both anticipated and unpredictable obstacles. For instance, the circuit 
must master the size and composition of the new court's docket and secure 
appreciation of various appellate procedures' efficacy. 
The judges of the proposed Twelfth Circuit may experience corre-
sponding difficulties in adjusting to the new system. These features could 
range from the comparatively mundane, such as working with unfamiliar 
or newly trained appeals court staff, to the relatively serious, such as sit-
ting more frequently on panels with the same colleagues or expeditiously 
resolving a different case mix.146 
The Ninth Circuit Executive Office predicted that the proposed 
Twelfth Circuit would replicate functions which the existing Ninth Cir-
cuit now performs satisfactorily.147 The Office's elaboration of this prog-
nostication summarized or expanded some ideas above and added several 
new concepts: 
Administratively, the creation of a new circuit would require dupli-
cative offices of clerk of court, circuit executive, staff attorneys, set-
tlement attorneys, and library, as well as courtrooms, mail and com-
puter facilities. In addition, approximately 40,000 square feet of 
new headquarters space would be required, all of which would du-
plicate offices and space in San Francisco. Further, a small circuit, 
with its concomitant small caseload, would underutilize judicial re-
sources and reduce the opportunities for efficiencies available to a 
larger circuit.148 
14
• See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text. Alabama, Florida, and Georgia are not only 
distant geographically, but also have quite different legal and nonlegal cultures than the five states of 
the Pacific Northwest. 
m For instance, some judges may find the Twelfth Circuit's more homogenous appellate docket 
less challenging; see infra text accompanying notes 151-53 (affording more discussion of collegiality). 
m See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 2. 
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In sum, the Ninth Circuit's division would provide the proposed Ninth 
Circuit no true relief in the near term and is likely to worsen its situation 
in the longer term. Division will have an immediate and long term posi-
tive impact on the states that comprise the new Twelfth Circuit and that 
court. Nevertheless, the advantages could be rather costly to procure and 
their realization may be delayed, while the gains would come at the ex-
pense of the proposed Ninth Circuit. 
S. 956's sponsors, in recommending that Hawaii, Guam, and the 
Northern Mariana Islands be part of the new Ninth Circuit, not the pro-
posed Twelfth Circuit, as S. 948 specified, are suggesting that the Con-
gress create a new Twelfth Circuit comprising a small group of adjacent 
jurisdictions which share a common background and a reasonably close 
regional identity.149 The five states that would constitute the proposed 
Twelfth Circuit resemble each other more than any of them resembles 
California. The jurisdictions have somewhat similar land bases, popula-
tions, and economies. For example, each state has millions of acres of na-
tional forests, is rather sparsely populated, and is financially dependent on 
tourism, extractive industries, such as mining, and renewable resources, 
particularly timber. 
It is easy to overstate the degree of regional homogeneity, however. For 
instance, phenomena such as maritime trade and Pacific fisheries, which 
have considerable significance to Alaska, Oregon, and Washington, are of 
limited consequence to Idaho and Montana. The local legal and nonlegal 
cultures in Seattle more closely resemble those of San Francisco than of 
Anchorage, Boise, or even Portland, much less any Montana city. It is 
also important to remember that jurisdictions such as Idaho and Montana 
historically derived much of their law from California, and that courts 
there continue to consult the jurisprudence of California in interpreting 
148 S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 2-3. This information and the insufficient capac-
ity of the existing facilities to accommodate the new judicial officers, court personnel, and records seem 
to contradict Senator Burns's admonition that S. 956 will necessitate no new buildings as the new 
Twelfth Circuit will occupy extant Ninth Circuit structures. See Burns statement, supra note 122, at 
S7506; see also supra note 33 and accompanying text (suggesting that existence of administrative 
offices in Seattle may ameliorate certain start-up costs). 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 88-90. The five states will also generate relatively homo-
geneous issues for appellate review. 
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and applying their own law. Finally, the notion of an appeals court com-
prising several contiguous states that share a common background may be 
an outmoded precept.1150 
C. Additional Arguments for S~nate Bill 9 56 
Additional ideas that the advocates of S. 956 have not expressed or have 
enunciated only implicitly support the legislation. Perhaps most important 
is a cluster of concepts that come under the rubric of collegiality. Regard-
less of whether the proposed Twelfth Circuit has seven or nine active 
judges,1151 it will have considerably fewer judges than the fifteen the Judi-
cial Conference has suggested as the maximum.1152 
This rather small complement of judges will multiply opportunities for 
the court's members to interact. Each Twelfth Circuit judge will serve on 
panels to hear cases, work on Circuit Judicial Council efforts, and partici-
pate at Circuit Judicial Conference meetings much more often with every 
other member of the court. The increased exposure and familiarity among 
the circuit's members should facilitate cooperation and enhance productiv-
ity in numerous relevant contexts. More specifically, judges who together 
must decide a larger number of appeals might well reach agreement and 
write opinions faster. They may also develop better means of communicat-
ing and resolving their differences and be more willing to assume special 
assignments and to assist their colleagues.1153 
An appellate court with fewer judges could off er additional advantages. 
One potential benefit is that it might eliminate the need to employ some 
extraordinary procedures that can be relatively ineffective. The Ninth 
Circuit's limited en bane mechanism arguably offers an example. Critics 
"complain that the device is expensive and time-consuming without being 
100 See supra notes 85, 88-90 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 162, 164 and accom-
panying text (suggesting that smaller circuits reduce federalizing role and balkanize law). 
101 See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
102 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 48 (1974). This two-decade-old recommendation is 
dated, given ensuing developments such as caseload expansion, congressional authorization of twenty-
eight judges for the Ninth Circuit, and the former Fifth Circuit's division. 
103 I would be remiss if I failed to include the obligatory allusion to the trite saying that famili-
arity can also breed contempt, a phenomenon which the experiences of certain judges on another 
circuit may illustrate. See Carl Tobias, The D.C. Circuit as a National Court, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
159, 169-70 (1993). See generally F,RANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL 213-29 (1994). 
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effective to maintain a unity in the law of the circuit.m114 Moreover, evi-
dence suggests that the court's judges are reluctant to invoke the mea-
sure.11515 On average, the Ninth Circuit has reheard en bane only nine 
cases per year.1156 Chief Judge J. Clifford Wallace, however, has been 
favorably impressed with the technique,1157 while the Federal Courts 
Study Committee recommended that other circuits adopt the special en 
bane mechanism.1158 
D. Additional Arguments Against Senate Bill 956: The Limited Strat-
egy of Circuit-splitting 
There are several arguments against S. 956 that I have alluded to or 
treated implicitly above, and they warrant little additional examination 
here. For instance, the new Twelfth Circuit's creation would impose sig-
nificant start-up and permanent costs, forfeit the sense of community 
which many Ninth Circuit judges and attorneys now share, and sacrifice 
certain advantages accruing from the Ninth Circuit's experimentation 
with innovative appellate procedures.1159 Two ideas, the inadvisability of 
creating circuit judgeships and of bifurcating appellate courts nationally 
and on the West Coast, however, are sufficiently important to merit addi-
tional consideration. 
Apart from the Ninth Circuit's specific circumstances, the division of 
appeals courts constitutes a limited reform that is simply ineffective. The 
larger appellate courts, such as the Second and the District of Columbia 
Circuits, that encounter greater difficulties than the remaining appeals 
courts, are resistant to feasible splitting as a practical matter.160 The few 
benefits and the numerous disadvantages, including the considerable costs, 
1
"' Baker, supra note 1, at 930. 
10
• See Gorton Position Paper, supra note 55, at 7; Navarro Letter, supra note 39, at 575. 
1
•• See Gorton Position Paper, supra note 55, at 7; Baker, supra note 1, at 930. 
1
•
7 Judge J. Clifford Wallace, Address at the Univ. of Cal. Law School at Berkeley (Dec. 2, 
1982), reprinted in John LateeC,justice on Appeal; A Proposal, Los ANGELES DAILY J. REP., Sept. 
29, 1989, at 6, 9. 
1
•• FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 114-15. 
1
•• See supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text; see also infra note 201 (asserting that the 
Ninth Circuit is valuable for experimentation). 
160 See Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the 
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 587 (1969); Hellman, supra note 
22, at 1192-1237. 
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which accompanied the former Fifth Circuit>s bifurcation attest to this 
approach's inefficacy.161 Moreover, dividing appellate courts irretrievably 
reduces circuits' federalizing role, decreasing their role as national courts 
and increasing their impact as regional courts.162 
As a theoretical proposition, circuit-splitting might appear more worka-
ble if Congress redrew the boundaries of the entire appeals court system 
at once. However, the initial equalization realized by, for example, estab-
lishing twenty circuits of nine judges each would be too disruptive.168 The 
symmetry and limited improvements attained would undercut the appel-
late courts' federalizing role and additionally balkanize the fragmented 
law of the circuits.164 Numerous judges and writers have criticized the 
concept of mincing appeals courts as an idea which is even worse than 
splitting them.1615 
Dividing the Ninth Circuit or invoking it as a reason to establish many 
smaller circuits is flawed because each notion ignores the actual difficul-
ties. Splitting appellate court'> fails to solve one circuit's complications and 
simply defers the resolution of the problems of two circuits.166 The rem-
edy proffered for the Ninth Circuit, therefore, reflects a considerably 
broader conundrum. 
Allocating the Ninth Circuit's present docket between the proposed 
Ninth and Twelfth Circuits will only shift, not reduce, the workload and 
would actually impose more burdensome responsibilities on the new 
Ninth Circuit than either the proposed Twelfth Circuit will have or than 
the existing Ninth Circuit has. The total number of cases to be decided 
would remain identical, regardless of the number of appellate courts that 
heard the appeals. The difficulties of the largest circuits principally derive 
from Congress's historic willingness to authorize more judges and expand 
161 See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text. 
162 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 3, at 10-13 (5th ed. 1994); 
Wisdom, supra note 94, at 788. 
163 See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 228. "More circuits multiply intercircuit conflicts 
and the resulting hegemony of national law is one of the principal banes of the federal appellate court 
system." Baker, supra note 1, at 946 (citing Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need 
for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1400, 1404-09 (1987)). 
1~ See Baker, supra note 1, at 946. 
160 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1, at 945-46; Gee, supra note 20, at 806. 
166 See Thomas E. Baker, A Postscript on Precedent in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 36 Sw. L.J. 
725, 742 (1982). 
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federal court jurisdiction while leaving untreated multiplying caseloads. 
Former Chief Judge Goodwin aptly summarized most of these 
propositions: 
Splitting the Ninth Circuit, or other circuits, would not address the 
real problem facing the Federal Courts of Appeals. The problem is 
not structure, but workload. Creating more regional circuits would 
not diminish the work, but merely divide it. The number of cases 
that must be heard by three-judge panels nationwide would remain 
the same and continue to grow no matter how many new circuits are 
formed.167 
The policy of creating additional judgeships and dividing appeals courts 
has eroded significant attributes of the circuit court system. The legislative 
approach of adding judges as a response to docket growth has not kept 
pace and might have actually exacerbated the problems experienced by the 
big appellate courts. The several thousand combinations of three-judge 
panels that now exist in the large appeals courts can have numerous ad-
verse consequences. The combinations may complicate efforts to monitor 
the law, enhance the opportunities for intracircuit inconsistencies, make 
rehearing en bane unmanageable, and strain relations among individual 
judges on different panels and between panels and the en bane court.168 
Congressional increases in the number of judges have apparently 
yielded few permanent improvements, and this solution has principally 
served as a braking mechanism.169 For instance, a writer who comprehen-
sively assessed the omnibus judgeships legislation170 concluded that adding 
"judges only delayed what appear[ed] to be a nearly inexorable climb in 
appeals taken"171 to the appellate courts and that there had been a mere 
187 Alfred T. Goodwin, Splitting the Ninth Circuit-No Answer to Caseload Growth, OR. ST. 
B. BULL., Jan. 1990, at 10, 11. 
188 See Harry Edwards, The Rising Work Load and Perceived "Bureaucracy" of the Federal 
Courts: A Causation-Based Approach to the Search for Appropriate Remedies, 68 low A L. REV. 
871, 918-19 (1983); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Reflections on the Independence, Good Behavior, and 
Workload of Federal judges, 55 U. CoLO. L. REV. 1, 10-11 (1983); see also supra note 153. 
189 See Baker, supra note 1, at 948; see also Patrick Higginbotham, Bureaucracy-the Carci-
noma of the Federal judiciary, 31 ALA. L. REV. 261, 270 (1980). 
170 Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, 92 Stat. 1629, 1629-32 (1978). 
171 WILLIAM P. MCLAUGHLAN, FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 107 (1984). 
212 Id. 
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one-year effect on the appeals-per-panel ratio.172 Simply authorizing more 
judgeships threatens to worsen the unintended impacts on the circuits. 
Expanding the appeals court bench could further tax the judicial confir-
mation process and might even lead to the appointment of less qualified 
judges.173 A larger appellate judiciary would reduce collegiality among 
judges and would foster greater inconsistency, promoting concomitant un-
certainty and increases in litigation.174 Congress may also be decreasingly 
willing to incur the expense of creating additional judgeships, much less of 
establishing new appeals courts, as Congress exhibits growing concern 
about the escalating national budget and deficit.175 
The concepts articulated above have led their exponents and other 
knowledgeable federal court observers to suggest . that authorizing more 
circuit judges in the context of the present appellate system is a strategy 
with limited promise that may even be counterproductive. For example, as 
early as 1954, Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter warned that the 
courts' growing business could not "be met by a steady increase in the 
number of federal judges" because he believed that this solution would not 
alleviate mounting dockets and was "bound to depreciate the quality of 
the federal judiciary and thereby adversely to affect the whole system."176 
During 1980, Judge Patrick Higginbotham stated that legislative creation 
of additional judgeships "seemed to be the only positive response to the 
courts' increasing number of cases ... [but it] ought to be the last resort, 
not the first.m77 Soon after Congress divided the former Fifth Circuit that 
same year, Senator Howell Heflin (D-Ala.) remarked that "Congress rec-
ognized that a point is reached where the addition of judges decreases the 
ns See Baker, supra note 1, at 949. See generally Laura Little, Loyalty, Gratitude and the 
Federal judiciary, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 699 (1995}; Carl Tobias, Rethinking Federal Judicial Selec-
tion, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1257. 
m See Baker, supra note 1, at 949; see also supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
m See Baker, supra note 1, at 948; see also supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text. This 
paragraph and the one immediately above implicate the controversial, ongoing debate over the optimal 
size of the federal judiciary. For a sense of this debate, see Commentary On Determining the Size of 
the Federal judiciary, 27 CONN. L. REV. 851-913 (1995). See generally GORDON BERMANT ET AL., 
IMPOSING A MORATORIUM ON THE NUMBER OF FEDERAL JUDGES (Federal Judicial Center 1993). 
no Lumberman's Mut. Casualty Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring). 
177 Higginbotham, supra note 169, at 270. Judge Higginbotham is the chair of the Advisory 
Committee on the Civil Rules. 
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effectiveness of the court, complicates the administration of uniform law, 
and potentially diminishes the quality of justice within a circuit.ni79 
In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee found that the number of 
appeals court judges had nearly tripled in the preceding three decades, 
that each circuit had an average complement of thirteen judges, and that 
conservative caseload projections suggested the need for 315 appellate 
judges and an average court size of twenty-four judges by 1999 .179 The 
Study Committee then warned that "tribunals of seventeen, much less 
twenty-four, sitting in panels of three, may resemble a judgeship pool 
more than a single body providing unified circuit leadership and prece-
dent," even as it acknowledged that "large courts such as these may be 
workable."180 The Committee then questioned "[w]hether tribunals of 
thirty or forty judges will be workable," characterizing them as "more 
problematic," because the issue is "not simply one of administration but of 
the effect, both within the circuit and nationally, of so many uncoordi-
nated opinions from so many judges."181 
It bears repeating that there is a lack of consensus among federal courts 
experts about precisely what difficulties growing dockets cause and 
whether they create complications that are sufficiently troubling to war-
rant treatment, particularly with structural measures that are as contro-
versial as splitting appeals courts. Professor Arthur Hellman's valuable 
continuing research on the operation of circuit precedent provides a help-
ful, additional illustration.182 As of June 1995, he had found no evidence 
that the appellate court system needs more authoritative precedents, a de-
termination that seriously questions an essential premise underlying most 
structural reform proposals, especially circuit-division.183 
Numerous respected individuals and entities have also challenged the 
wisdom of applying structural solutions. In a March 1995 report, the 
178 Howell Heflin, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980-0verdue Re-
lief for an Overworked Court, 11 CUMB. L. REV. 597, 616 (1980). Senator Heflin did find that 
circuit realignment was "necessary in the case of the Fifth Circuit to create a firm base for durable 
reform." Id. at 616 n.101. Senator Heflin was chair of the subcommittee that held the hearing on S. 
948, and he served as a member of the Federal Courts Study Committee. 
119 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 114. 
18° FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 114. 
181 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 114. 
182 See, e.g., Hellman, supra note 4; Hellman, supra note 22; Hellman, supra note 76. 
183 Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved ln-
tercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITT. L. REV. 693 (1995). 
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Committee on Long Range Planning of the Judicial Conference strongly 
recommended that circuits be restructured "only if compelling empirical 
evidence demonstrates adjudicative or administrative dysfunction in a 
court so that it cannot continue to deliver quality justice and coherent, 
consistent circuit law in the face of increasing workload.m84 In a 1993 
study of structural alternatives, the Federal Judicial Center (FJC) ascer-
tained that the federal civil justice system was under pressure, but that it 
did "not appear to be a stress that would be significantly relieved by 
structural change to the appellate system at this time."1815 In 1990, former 
Chief Judge Goodwin claimed that dividing appeals courts failed to ad-
dress the actual problem of workload which circuits confront because es-
tablishing additional regional appellate courts would not reduce the num-
ber of cases but simply split them.186 
It is important to appreciate that there is considerably more agreement 
among students of the federal courts that increasing appeals create diffi-
culties than there is about these complications' exact nature, whether they 
require treatment, and which mechanisms would most effectively address 
the difficulties. For example, Professor Baker's review of the voluminous 
literature, including ten major assessments· of the circuit court system, led 
him to remark that the "commonly-repeated perception is that the 
caseload has come to threaten the federal appellate ideal and some reform 
is needed."187 Notwithstanding Professor Baker's equally thorough exami-
nation of the many antidotes which have been prescribed for the rising 
number of appeals, he could identify no superior approach and recom-
mended additional study.188 Judge Edith Jones of the Fifth Circuit and 
Judge Stephen Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit concurred that growing 
appellate dockets cause problems for which circuit-splitting is not the 
1
"' LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 42. Fifteen years earlier, Senator Heflin had simi-
larly observed: "Changes in the structure of the federal court appellate system are not to be executed 
without careful study and much deliberation. Dramatic changes in the demands placed upon a court 
which seriously threaten its effectiveness justify legislative and judicial reexamination of the appellate 
system." Heflin, supra note 178, at 616. 
180 See MCKENNA, supra note 112, at 155. 
186 Goodwin, supra note 167, at 11. 
187 BAKER, supra note 4, at 33. 
188 BAKER, supra note 4, at 295-300. 
189 See Edith H. Jones, Back to the Future for Federal Appeals Courts: Rationing Federal 
justice by Recovering Limited jurisdiction, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1485 (1995) (book review); Stephen 
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preferable solution, 189 even though they disagreed sharply on the best 
remedies. 190 
During 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee began its discussion 
of the difficulties facing the appeals courts by stating: "However people 
may view other aspects of the federal judiciary, few deny that its appellate 
courts are in a 'crisis of volume' that has transformed them from the insti-
tutions they were even a generation ago."191 The Committee then pre-
dicted that "more fundamental change" seemed inevitable, barring re-
duced circuit workloads, a prospect which appeared unlikely.192 By 
comparison, in 1993, the F JC det$!1illined that structural modifications 
would not significantly relieve the stress under which the appellate system 
was laboring, 193 and this March, the Judicial Conference Long Range 
Planning Committee strongly opposed circuit restructuring.194 
In short, numerous observers who are intimately familiar with federal 
court operations agree that mounting appeals do cause at least some com-
plications which are grave enough to warrant serious consideration of pos-
sible remedies. Nonetheless, they also believe that structural solutions are 
controversial and that circuit-splitting may be one of the least effective 
responses. 
A number of knowledgeable individuals and entities have suggested that 
the problems of the Ninth Circuit do not warrant structural solutions and 
have criticized the court's division. For instance, Michael Traynor, chair 
of the Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, warned that splitting the appeals 
court "could fracture the unified interpretation of the Federal environ-
mental laws that the Ninth Circuit consistently applies throughout the 
Reinhardt, Surveys Without Solutions: Another Study of the United States Courts of Appeals, 73 
TEX. L. REV. 1505 (1995) (book review). 
190 Judge Jones prefers "limiting the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction." Jones, supra 
note 189, at 1486. Judge Reinhardt prefers adding more judges. See Reinhardt, supra note 189, at 
1507. I chose these two judges because they have quite diverse political perspectives. 
191 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 109. 
192 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 109. When s. 948's 
advocates requested that the Study Committee specifically stamp its imprimatur on the legislation, this 
entity assumed "no position" preferring to defer to Congress. FEDERAL CouRTS STUDY COMMITTEE 
REPORT, supra note 109, at 123. The Committee did not endorse but explored "various structural 
alternatives ... to stimulate further inquiry and discussion" among Congress, the courts, bar associa-
tions and scholars. FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 116-17. 
193 See supra notes 114, 185 and accompanying text. 
1
•• See supra notes 116, 184 and accompanying text. 
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Western States.m95 Senator Wilson correspondingly posed the rhetorical 
question whether the proposed Ninth and Twelfth Circuits would apply 
different substantive law "at the mouth than at the headwaters" of the 
Klamath River, which begins in Oregon and terminates on the California 
coast.196 Former Chief Judge Goodwin and Chief Judge Wallace claimed 
that splitting the appeals court would not address the real difficulty facing 
the circuit, its workload,197 but would merely increase conflicts between 
appellate courts for the Supreme Court to resolve.196 Judge Goodwin as-
serted that the "size of the Ninth Circuit is more an asset than a 
liability."199 
The Ninth Circuit Executive Office offered many cogent arguments 
against splitting the court in 1990, 1991, and in June of 1995.200 The 
Office repeated numerous ideas which have already been examined here 
and articulated a few new concepts. It criticized division by repeating the 
contentions that bifurcation would promote intercircuit inconsistency and 
would not treat the basic complication of rising caseloads.201 The Office 
suggested that division would enable litigants to forum shop and that at-
torneys have encountered little difficulty keeping abreast of the court's de-
cisions because the "number of published opinions issued by the circuit 
has remained relatively constant" over the last seven years.202 
Three experienced students of the Ninth Circuit have summarized 
many of the above propositions. Former Chief Judge James Browning, 
who led the court for fifteen years and who implemented numerous re-
forms, stated: 
The Ninth Circuit is the only remaining laboratory in which to test 
whether the values of a large circuit can be preserved. If we fail, 
there is no alternative to fragmentation of the circuits, centralization 
19
• S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 508 (statement of Michael Traynor). 
198 S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 508 (statement of Sen. Pete Wilson). 
197 Goodwin, supra note 167, at 11; Albert, supra note 45, at 12. 
198 See Goodwin, supra note 167, at 11; Albert, supra note 45, at 12-13 (quoting Judge 
Wallace). 
199 Goodwin, supra note 167, at 11. 
••• See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28. 
001 See S. 956 PosITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 4-5, 7-8. 
••• See S. 956 POSITION PAPER, supra note 28, at 2, 5. The Federal Courts Study Committee 
also seemed to suggest that the Ninth Circuit might serve as an alternative to the approach of creating 
judgeships and splitting appeals courts that has prevailed since the 1891 founding of the modern 
appellate system. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 122-23. 
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of administrative authority in Washington, increased conflict in cir-
cuit decisions, a growing burden on the Supreme Court, and crea-
tion of a fourth tier of appellate review in the federal system. If we 
succeed, no further division of circuits will be necessary. Indeed, 
combining the circuits into four or five might well be feasi-
ble-creating stronger and more effective appellate courts, lightening 
the burden on the Supreme Court, and resulting in a decentralized 
and more efficient administrative system for the federal judicial 
system.203 
Professor Baker, who recently completed one of the most thorough studies 
of the appellate system ever undertaken and who incisively analyzed the 
proposal to split the court five years ago, "asserted: 
[T]he strategy of adding judges and dividing circuits simply has been 
played out and is no longer defensible as a long-range plan. Senate 
Bill 948 is an idea whose time has come and gone. The justifications 
offered so far for dividing the Ninth Circuit simply do not withstand 
a close scrutiny .... Dividing the Ninth Circuit is the least available 
application of the strategy of division [because it] will prove nothing 
that has not been demonstrated repeatedly, most recently at the divi-
sion of the Fifth Circuit. 204 
Professor Hellman, who has studied the appeals courts extensively and 
the Ninth Circuit in particular, contended in a prepared statement during 
the hearings on S. 948: "In my judgment, dividing the Ninth Circuit is 
neither necessary nor desirable at this time. Rather, the circuit should be 
allowed to continue an experiment in judicial administration that will ul-
timately redound to the benefit of the entire federal judicial system."20G 
In sum, the above examination of the historical developments that pre-
ceded the recent introduction of Senate Bill 956 and the survey of the 
arguments in favor of and against the legislation suggest that the Ninth 
Circuit's division is inadvisable. The next section of this article, therefore, 
••• Mary M. Schroeder, Jim Brawning as a Leader of judges: A View from a Follawer, 21 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 3, 7 (1989) (quoting Chief Judge James R. Browning). Accord Levin H. Campbell, 
Into the Third Century: Views of the Appellate System from the Federal Courts Study Committee, 74 
MASS. L. REV. 292, 297-98 (1989). 
•o< Baker, supra note 1, at 960; see also BAKER, supra note 4 (providing thorough study). 
••• Professor Hellman has also served as Deputy Executive Director of the Hruska Commission 
and Director of the Ninth Circuit's central legal staff. S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 654 (pre-
pared statement of Arthur D. Hellman). 
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offers recommendations for the future by emphasizing fundamental re-
forms, such as those which the Federal Courts Study Committee 
explored.206 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
The assessment in the first two segments of this Article indicates that 
the course of action embodied in Senate Bill 956 lacks promise. The eval-
uation also shows that the Ninth Circuit and other appellate courts are 
experiencing certain phenomena, primarily involving docket growth, 
which might warrant attention. The Ninth Circuit's mounting caseload, 
the correspondingly long time that it requires to resolve appeals, and the 
large number of additional judgeships that the circuit and the Judicial 
Conference have requested could deserve consideration.207 It may be 
worthwhile to update the information, ideas, and approaches that existed 
when Congress rejected S. 948 in 1990; to collect, analyze, and synthesize 
the more recent data, and to ventilate the issues relevant to splitting ap-
peals courts. 
Congress will probably learn little that is new and may well decide that 
the reasons for dividing the Ninth Circuit now are no more persuasive 
than they were in 1990. Congress should capitalize on the opportunity 
which S. 956's introduction affords, however, to study what expanding 
dockets mean for the appellate system. Indeed, Sections I and II suggest 
that numerous students of the federal courts differ over the exact compli-
cations that growing caseloads cause and whether they are serious enough 
to justify treatment, and, if so, over which measures will best address the 
difficulties. Nonetheless, observers believe that the rising rate of appeals 
can be problematic and that circuit splitting is at best a palliative. 
208 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMMITfEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 116-23. On September 
13, 1995, the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hearing on S. 956. Witnesses provided virtually no 
new information on bifurcating the Ninth Circuit. A partial exception was Ninth Circuit Judge 
Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain. He may have been the first active judge of the court to endorse publicly the 
idea of splitting the Ninth Circuit. Judge O'Scannlain also proposed that California be divided. The 
Ninth Circuit Split: Hearings on S. 956 Before the Senate Committee on the judiciary, 104th Cong., 
1st Sess. 2 (1995) (statement of Diarmuid F. O'Scannlain, U.S. Circuit Judge for the Ninth Circuit). 
Even that idea was not new, as the Hruska Commission had proposed the concept two decades ago. 
See infra text accompanying notes 302-05. 
207 See supra notes 54-55, 58-59, 62, 64, 120, 122, 124-25, infra note 288 and accompanying 
text. 
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This section emphasizes basic reform proposals. Almost all of these op-
tions are controversial and Congress may not adopt any of them; there-
fore, this section then proposes more modest approaches, such as future 
appellate court experimentation and additional study of the circuits and 
their growing dockets. Finally, it suggests improvements to S. 956 should 
senators and representatives seriously consider the legislation.208 
A. Comparatively Fundamental Reforms Principally Relating to Ap-
pellate Structure 
1. Federal Courts Study Committee Proposals 
a. Descriptive Analysis of the Proposals 
The efforts of the Federal Courts Study Committee are a helpful de-
parture point for assessing comparatively fundamental reforms that prin-
cipally implicate the appeals courts' structure.209 During 1990, the Com-
mittee evaluated several essential structural possibilities to address 
mounting appellate caseloads. Its report discussed five of those prospects 
to promote future inquiry and debate among Congress and the legal 
community.210 
The Committee's initial proposal was that circuit boundaries be period-
ically redrawn to attain regional appeals courts of nine judges and that the 
20
• The earlier apologia suggests my uncertainity about the precise character of the difficulties 
that rising numbers of appeals cause, whether they are sufficiently problematic to warrant treatment, 
and, if so, which remedies are best. See supra note 3. Even if I were more confident about identifica-
tion of the problems, no solution seems clearly superior, much less a panacea. Therefore, I attempt 
selectively to designate and evaluate those approaches which seem more promising. Congress· should 
also keep in mind the possibility of less global solutions, such as circuit-specific remedies. 
20
• I rely substantially in this subsection on the FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, 
supra note 109, at 118-23, and the valuable elaboration of the Committee's proposals in BAKER, 
supra note 4, at 238-79, as well as on the work of several contributors to Hellman, supra note 4. The 
exhaustive evaluation of the benefits and disadvantages of the approaches in these sources and the 
examination of certain aspects of two of the above five options obviate the need to off er more than 
descriptive analyses in this section. Because court consolidation is apparently a preferable approach, I 
accord it more detailed treatment. For alternatives other than the five structural options which the 
Federal Courts Study Committee explored, I attempt to evaluate the benefits and disadvantages of the 
approaches. Insofar as I have preferences, I try to indicate and justify them. It is important to remem-
ber that no remedy appears to be a panacea, that circuit-specific solutions may be preferable, and that 
Congress must make the ultimate policy determination . 
... FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 116-17. 
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existing geographic circuits be dissolved.211 This alternative would require 
the new circuits to follow prior precedent declared by panels in each re-
gion unless overruled by the Supreme Court. This option contemplated a 
centralized division of representative judges, functioning as a type of na-
tional en bane court, which would review panel determinations to resolve 
inconsistencies. This would limit the number of conflicts that having more 
circuits would inevitably produce.212 
A second suggestion was to create a new appellate level.213 Approxi-
mately twenty-five regional appellate divisions with nine judges each 
would hear appeals of right, and five higher-tier appellate courts encom-
passing larger geographic areas would entertain discretionary appeals 
from these divisions. The Supreme Court would exercise discretionary ju-
risdiction to consider appeals from the upper-tier tribunals.214 
A third proposal was to establish courts with national subject matter 
jurisdiction in areas such as admiralty, civil rights, and labor, which 
would coexist with the current circuits.215 A variation on this theme was 
the creation of subject matter panels in the present appellate courts.216 
The Study Committee's fourth proposal was to merge the existing circuits 
into one centrally organized tribunal with the power to establish and ab-
rogate subject matter panels as necessary.217 The new entity could corre-
spondingly formulate internal procedures to resolve inconsistencies.218 The 
Committee's final suggestion was the consolidation of the current appeals 
courts into some five '~umbo" circuits, each of which would resemble the 
211 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 118-19; see also supra 
notes 163-65 and accompanying text (affording additional critical analysis). 
212 See BAKER, supra note 4, at 239-42 (providing additional valuable analysis). 
213 See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 119-20. 
214 See BAKER, supra note 4, at 230-61. 
21
• See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 120-21; see also 
Carrington, supra note 160, at 604-12 (affording additional analysis); Daniel J. Meador, A Chal-
lenge to Judicial Architecture: Modifying the Regional Design of the U.S. Courts of Appeal, 56 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 603 (1989) (same). See generally ABA Report, supra note 34, at 532-40 . 
••• See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 120-21; see also 
BAKER, supra note 4, at 261-69; Daniel J. Meador, An Appellate Court Dilemma and a Solution 
Through Subject Matter Organization, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 471 (1983). 
217 See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 121. 
218 See generally BAKER, supra note 4, at 269-76 (affording additional valuable analysis). 
219 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 122-23. 
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present Ninth Circuit.219 Members of these jumbo courts might rotate 
among subject matter panels in specialized fields. 220 
The Committee's principal purpose in presenting these five options was 
to stimulate discussion.221 The Committee may have been suggesting that 
consolidation and the existing Ninth Circuit might create alternatives to 
the traditional strategy of adding judges and dividing appeals courts that 
Congress has followed since it passed the Evarts Act in 1891.222 
b. A Closer Look at Consolidation 
Creating judgeships and splitting appellate courts may well be ideas 
whose time has passed. If Congress believes, nonetheless, that additional 
judges are an appropriate response to steadily rising caseloads, it should 
seriously consider consolidating the intermediate appeals court system. 
Consolidation treats the Ninth Circuit as a model rather than a problem 
to be rectified.223 Congress can extract instructive insights from the Ninth 
Circuit's creative approaches to appellate procedure, modernization, reor-
ganization of administrative structures, and employment of technology, all 
of which have contributed to an efficient, consistent circuit despite its 
size.224 
Consolidation would reduce conflicts among appeals courts, a major 
weakness of the existing appellate structure.225 Intercircuit inconsistency 
arises when appellate court judges refuse to consider dispositive other re-
gional appeals courts' opinions and invoke the law of their circuit and 
rehearings en bane to address expanding dockets and increasing judge-
ships. 226 The consolidation of existing courts, by abolishing the circuits' 
geographical boundaries and merging them into a single unified adminis-
trative and jurisdictional tier, would eliminate these conflicts among ap-
pellate courts, although the enhanced intracircuit inconsistency must be 
treated. 
••• See generally BAKER, supra note 4, at 277-79 . 
.., FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 116-17. See generally J. 
Clifford Wallace, The Case For Large Federal Courts of Appeals, 77 JumcATURE 288 (1994) . 
••• FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 122-23. 
••• Baker, supra note 1, at 953. 
2
"' See Baker, supra note 1, at 953-54; supra notes 32-37 and accompanying text. 
••• See Baker & McFarland, supra note 163, at 1404-09; Thomas E. Baker, Precedent Times 
Three: Stare Decisis in the Divided Fifth Circuit, 35 Sw. L.J. 687, 720-24 (1981). 
••• See Baker, supra note 1, at 954. 
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Unification would create one United States Court of Appeals and elimi-
nate the Federal Circuit and the regional appeals courts.227 Three-judge 
panels that would be consolidated from some forty regular "general divi-
sions," typically consisting of four judges from different, neighboring 
states, would continue to resolve cases.228 Every general division would 
exercise jurisdiction over appeals from a similar number of designated dis-
trict judges. 
Increases in oral presentations and dispositions and reductions in writ-
ten opinions are this plan's hallmarks. Cases that raise important issues of 
federal law would require supplementation of panels with four additional 
judges drawn from "special divisions" identified by subject area.229 Mem-
bers of these augmented courts would participate in judicial conferences 
and collegial deliberations, circulate and extensively amend draft deci-
sions, and issue published opinions. Supplemental determinations would 
have effect across the country, thus nationalizing the current idea of the 
law of the circuit. 
Proponents of consolidation claim that it will lead to the expeditious, 
inexpensive, and equitable resolution of appeals.230 The system would also 
promote more coherent national law and end conflicts among appellate 
courts. This course of action would alleviate judges' concern about main-
taining the law of the circuit and would utilize judicial officers more 
efficiently.231 
Unification is controversial, however. Critics have suggested that this 
model might fragment and specialize the bench, while the approach could 
facilitate congressional creation of more judgeships because it can absorb 
227 Several observers have considered this model. See Carrington, supra note 160, at 612-17; 
Maurice Rosenberg, Planned Flexibility To Meet Changing Needs of the Federal Appellate System, 
59 CORNELL L. REV. 576, 591-95 (1974); J. Clifford Wallace, The Nature and Extent of Intercir-
cuit Conflicts: A Solution Needed for a Mountain or a Molehill?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 913, 940-41 
(1983); see also Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Disconnecting the Overloaded Circuits -A Plug for a Unified 
Court of Appeals, 39 ST. Louis U. L.J. 455, 465-69 (1995) (affording recent iteration of concept). I 
rely substantially on Professor Baker's distillation of Professor Carrington's blueprint, and I mean to 
illustrate recent thinking about consolidation by generalizing from the Ninth Circuit's experience. See 
Baker, supra note 1, at 955-59; see also BAKER, supra note 4, at 269-76 (affording additional valua-
ble analysis). 
228 See Baker, supra note 1, at 955. 
229 See Baker, supra note 1, at 956. 
230 See Baker, supra note 1, at 957-58. See generally Meador, supra note 215. 
231 See Baker, supra note 1, at 955-59. 
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an indeterminate number of new judges. The complicated structure could 
pose difficult organizational challenges. Moreover, every general division, 
which would no longer be required to publish opinions in most cases, 
could ignore nationally applicable law. In short, consolidation appears 
promising enough for Congress to consider this possibility carefully. 
2. Alternative Structural Reforms 
Apart from the five responses to increasing appellate dockets that the 
Federal Courts Study Committee explored, there are several alternatives 
that deserve mention.232 One option that the Long Range Planning Com-
mittee of the Judicial Conference has explored is restricting the number of 
circuit court judges who must decide cases.233 The Committee suggested 
that appeals court panels might consist of two judges, and it proposed 
experimenting with single-judge review in cases that present one issue and 
are subject to deferential review standards. 234 The most obvious benefit of 
limiting the si:ze of circuit panels would be the savings in time and effort 
that could be redirected to other judicial responsibilities. 
The application of both approaches might compromise the quality of 
appellate justice which litigants have traditionally received.2311 Two-judge 
panels could have difficulty resolving their disagreements over the merits 
of appeals,236 and single-judge review may significantly restrict appellate 
oversight of certain categories of cases.237 These potential complications, 
together with a lack of clarity about the likely benefits, mean that Con-
gress might pref er to consider the possibility of authorizing limited 
experimentation. 
282 I devoted less analysis to the five options that the Federal Courts Study Committee explored 
than to the alternatives considered here because these options have received less secondary treatment. 
This is obviously not an exhaustive, but rather a selective, represen!ative analysis of reforms. For 
additional discussion of these and other reforms, see BAKER, supra note 4; MCKENNA, supra note 
112; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115; Hellman, supra note 4. 
288 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 123-24. 
234 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 124. 
2
•• For explication of the idea of the appellate ideal, see BAKER, supra note 4, at 14-17, 21-30. 
238 The obvious problem is one-to-one votes, but special provisions can be made for this situa-
tion. See ABA Report, supra note 34, at 550. 
237 This may be especially true of cases that judges deem less worthy of consideration. See infra 
note 251 and accompanying text. For helpful analysis of adjunct judicial officers, such as appellate 
commissioners, see LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 123; MCKENNA, supra note 112, at 129-
33; Oakley, supra note 35, at 915-21. 
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Two additional alternatives, differentiated appeal management and en-
hanced reliance on district judges, can be conceptualized either as varia-
tions on discretionary appellate review or as hybrids of that option and 
structural reform.238 The Committee on Court Administration and Case 
Management of the Judicial Conference, among others, has examined dif-
ferentiated appeal management or "two-track" appellate review.239 
In this plan, three-judge screening panels would review cases for as-
signment. The appeals that judges identify for Track Two would receive 
plenary review, while the cases designated for Track One would receive 
summary disposition, perhaps with judgment orders that affirm the dis-
trict court.240 Permitting one of the screening panels' judges to place ap-
peals on Track Two should counter the possibilities that circuits might 
hastily resolve cases or might not fully review specific classes of appeals. If 
the assignment of cases to Track Two yields greater temporal savings 
than resource expenditures, judges could devote additional attention to 
other duties, such as hearing more complex appeals.241 
Assigning some circuit court functions to district judges through "appel-
late terms" or "appellate divisions" is another approach that a number of 
observers have proposed over the last half-century.242 The panels would 
principally insure error correction and screen issues of law for potential 
appeals court review, while additional consideration would only be af-
forded in the circuit court's discretion on petition, unless the first appellate 
panel certified the appeal.243 
The system would prohibit trial judges from hearing cases from their 
own districts.244 The Judicial Conference Long Range Planning Commit-
tee suggested that circuit courts experiment with greater use of district 
judges, that such a program be restricted initially to particular categories 
238 See infra text accompanying notes 247-54 (discussing discretionary appellate review). 
239 See Judicial Conference Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, Report 
to the Judicial Conference Committee on Long Range Planning (1993); see also MCKENNA, supra 
note 112, at 127-29 n.226 (affording analysis of procedure). See generally Oakley, supra note 35, at 
862-68. 
240 See McKENNA, supra note 112, at 127-29. 
241 I subject all three approaches examined in the text to similar cost-benefit analysis . 
... See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, APPELLATE PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES 390 (1941); Louis H. 
Pollak, Amici Curiae, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 811, 825-26 {1989) (book review). 
•<3 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 123-24. 
20 See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 123-24. 
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of appeals, and that Congress enlarge the pilot project's jurisdiction if it 
proves successful.2411 
Proponents of enhanced dependence on district court judges believe that 
such a system would off er a number of benefits, primarily by reducing 
current workloads of appellate court judges, thus giving them more time 
to consider a smaller number of appeals. The proposal would, however, 
necessitate a significant increase in the corps of district judges required to 
discharge these augmented responsibilities. Moreover, this model places 
substantial reliance on district judges, who were not appointed for this 
purpose and who may lack the experience, training, and temperament 
needed for these enlarged appellate court duties.246 The dubious ratio of 
benefits to disadvantages which the approach would apparently afford 
means that it deserves less serious consideration. 
3. Discretionary Appellate Review 
The replacement of the statutory right of appeal with discretionary re-
view, perhaps patterned on the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdiction, is 
an important potential means of addressing docket growth in addition to 
structural measures.247 Discretionary appellate review would oblige the 
circuits, individually or together, to develop procedures and criteria for 
deciding which appeals to hear. 
Advocates contend that such a proposal would afford numerous advan-
tages. For instance, the discretionary approach would save time, money, 
and effort. 248 Those cases that courts do designate for review would re-
ceive better treatment, including traditional collegial and deliberative ap-
••• See LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 124. 
••• Of course, many district judges currently assume these duties when they sit by designation on 
appeals courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 292 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993). See generally Richard B. Saphire & 
Michael E. Solimine, Diluting justice on Appeal?: An Examination of the Use of District Court 
judges Sitting by Designation on the United States Courts of Appeals, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 35 
(1995) . 
... See 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993); BAKER, supra note 4, at 234-38; MCKENNA, 
supra note 112, at 123-27. See generally Harlan Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) 
Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62 (1985). 
••• See Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeal, 34 
Sw. L.J. 1151, 1157 (1981). See generally BAKER, supra note 4, at 235. 
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pellate procedure, because judges would be processing fewer other 
appeals.249 
One difficulty with discretionary review is whether it would pass consti-
tutional muster.2150 A second concern is whether this alternative is desira-
ble as a policy matter. It would substantially modify the appeal of right, a 
procedure which has enjoyed a long and rich history in the federal courts. 
More specifically, the discretionary procedure would additionally compro-
mise the ability of circuits to correct errors and could ration their scarce 
resources into specific classes of cases which are deemed more worthy· of 
consideration than others.2151 
The Subcommittee on Structure of the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee asserted that this model would not be an improvement because discre-
tionary review "must be somewhat painstaking unless it is to do violence 
to the tradition of appellate error correction.''2152 The full Committee char-
acterized "certiorari for the courts of appeals as a last resort" even while 
encouraging "further study of the concept."2153 Professor Baker and Pro-
fessor Judith Resnik suggested that the option would take the circuit 
courts "much farther away from our appellate tradition," granting district 
judges too much authority and depriving parties of too much.2154 Because 
discretionary review would significantly change a time-honored, valuable 
federal court institution, Congress should probably consider it only after 
exhausting other less controversial options. 
4. Miscellaneous Reforms 
Several other substantial reforms deserve examination. The most im-
portant suggestion is restricting the original civil or criminal jurisdiction · 
of federal district courts.21515 'The candidates for limitation are diversity of 
249 See Lay, supra note 248, at 1157-58. 
200 See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Function of the Civil Appeal: A Late-Century View, 38 
S.C. L. REV. 411, 412-17 (1987); Michael Vitiello, The Appellate Lawyer's Role in the Caseload 
Crisis, 58 MISS. L.J. 437, 444-59 (1988) . 
... See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL 
SYSTEM 287-88 (1981); see also BAKER, supra note 4, at 237. 
••• BAKER, supra note 4, at 237 n.37 (citing Report of the Subcommittee on Structure to the 
Federal Courts Study Committee 34 (1990)). 
••
3 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 109, at 116 . 
... See BAKER, supra note 4, at 237-38; Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. 
REV. 603, 619 (1985). See generally ABA Report, supra note 34, at 547. , 
••• This was a central premise of the Long Range Planning Committee's Plan. See LONG 
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citizenship jurisdiction and federal question jurisdiction. Unfortunately, 
modifying diversity jurisdiction would provide little relief because trial 
court determinations in diversity cases constitute a minuscule percentage 
of the appellate docket.2156 Moreover, it is politically unrealistic to expect 
that Congress will meaningfully restrict federal question jurisdiction.2157 
These potential limitations on civil jurisdiction, therefore, warrant mini-
mal additional treatment here. 
Congress could also restrict appellate caseloads by reducing district 
courts' criminal jurisdiction. However, the perceived political gains to be 
derived from expanding federal criminal law, "'.'hi ch the 1994 crime legis-
lation's passage trenchantly reaffirmed, make the prospect of limiting 
criminal jurisdiction even less likely.2158 Furthermore, narrowing civil or 
criminal jurisdiction is purely derivative and would rely on the decreased 
number of appeals which litigants would take from fewer district court 
filings. 2159 In sum, restricting civil and criminal jurisdiction lacks promise 
because neither solution appears to be politically feasible.260 
RANGE PLAN, supra note 115, at 23-37. 
••• See supra note 98 and accompanying text. Even the legal reforms in the ninth tenet of the 
Contract With America do not directly attack diversity; see also CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 34, 
at 193-94. See generally Carl Tobias, Common Sen-se and Other Legal Reforms, 48 V AND. L. REV. 
699 (1995). 
207 See Stephen Breyer, Administering Justice in the First Circuit, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 29, 
34-37 (1990). Since the 1960s, Congress has continued to recognize new federal civil causes of action. 
See Carl Tobias, Rule 19 and the Public Rights Exception to Party joinder, 65 N.C. L. REV. 745, 
757 (1987); see also CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 34, at 192-93. But see Jones, supra note 189, 
at 1486. 
••• See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1796 (1994). Congress could make numerous changes in substantive criminal law that would 
significantly affect the federal courts' workload. For instance, Congress might reform the controver-
sial, time-consuming federal sentencing guidelines or the drug laws. 
••• There are numerous measures that seek to expedite the resolution, and termination, of crimi-
nal and civil cases that are pursued in district courts. See, e.g., Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 
93-619, 88 Stat. 2076 (1975); Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 
(1990). More specifically, alternative dispute resolution (ADR) is a favored technique for diverting 
cases at the trial court level. Numerous circuit courts correspondingly use a number of appellate ADR 
techniques whose use could be quantitatively and qualitatively expanded. See supra note 35, infra 
note 265 and accompanying text. 
28° For additional discussion of these and other reforms, see BAKER, supra note 4; LONG RANGE 
PLAN, supra note 115; MCKENNA, supra note 112; Hellman, supra note 4. 
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B. Comparatively Modest Approaches 
If Congress declines to make the basic reforms surveyed above and re-
jects S. 956, relatively modest approaches would warrant consideration, as 
the size of appeals courts' membership and dockets continues to grow and 
increasingly resembles the Ninth Circuit.261 The following recommenda-
tions for additional study and experimentation are principally directed to 
the Congress, although the appellate courts could institute most of the 
recommendations absent legislative authorization. 
1. Experimentation 
Should Congress reject the rather fundamental reforms enumerated al-
ready and S. 956, it ought to encourage new experimentation which treats 
the rising number of appeals and support ongoing initiatives instituted by 
many circuits. Congress could sponsor efforts to test the numerous options 
that federal court observers have proposed over the last century. 
Examples of such experimentation are assigning greater appellate re-
sponsibilities to district judges and reducing the size of appeals court 
panels, both of which the Judicial Conference Committee on Long Range 
Planning recently explored.262 More specifically, Congress could empower 
several circuits to experiment with the alternatives for a period that is 
sufficient to gauge their worth and mandate a careful study by the Federal 
Judicial Center of their efficacy, in terms of saving time and expense and 
of judicial and litigant satisfaction, for instance.263 
Illustrative of continuing endeavors which Congress should support is 
the Ninth Circuit's creative work implicating administrative reorganiza-
tion, appellate settlement, use of technology, and the limited en bane tech-
nique.264 Most of the other appeals courts have tested numerous mecha-
261 See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 122-23. I afford 
suggestions relating to these approaches before recommendations respecting S. 956 principally for ease 
or analysis, although the organizational structure selected admittedly reflects the policy choices that I 
consider most promising. Were Congress to consider seriously or even pass S. 956, it should seriously 
explore incorporating certain aspects or the suggestions relating to experimentation and additional 
study. 
262 See supra notes 233-37, 242-46 and accompanying text: 
263 Many additional possibilities could be offered. For enumeration or these possibilities, see 
BAKER, supra note 4; LONG RANGE PLAN, supra note 115; Hellman, supra note 4. 
264 See supra notes 32-37, 154-58 and accompanying text. 
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nisms that are both similar and different. For example, the Sixth and 
Seventh Circuits have instituted ambitious prehearing conference pro-
grams that resemble the Ninth Circuit efforts.265 In comparison, the 
Ninth Circuit premised its Capital Punishment Project on earlier Fifth 
and Eleventh Circuit initiatives.266 Application of various other alterna-
tives by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits should be instructive because both 
circuits have large complements of judges and substantial, growing 
caseloads.267 Moreover, nearly all appellate courts decide a significant 
percentage of cases without oral argument,266 while practically every cir-
cuit resolves many appeals without issuing published or even written 
opinions.269 
Congress must insure that any such experimentation receives rigorous 
analysis as a predicate for future policymaking.270 An independent evalu-
ator should scrutinize the application of the measures' application for 
enough time and in sufficiently diverse contexts to ascertain as definitively 
as possible whether the mechanisms are effective, for example, in expedit-
ing cases or improving the quality of appellate justice dispensed. Several 
Federal Judicial Center studies and the RAND Corporation's compre-
hensive assessment of the expense and delay reduction procedures that dis-
trict courts implemented under the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 can 
••• See supra note 35; see generally ANTHONY PARTRIDGE & ALLAN LIND, A REEVALUATION 
OF THE CIVIL APPEALS MANAGEMENT PLAN (Federal Judicial Center 1983) (affording analysis of 
Second Circuit program). 
••• See 1994 Ninth Circuit Capital Punishment Handbook, supra note 133, at Introductory 
Notes. 
••• See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text. See generally William T. Rule & Jeffrey 
Jackson, After the Split-The Recent Workload of the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth judicial Cir-
cuit, 14 Miss. C. L. REV. 281 (1994). 
••• See, e.g., Oakley, supra note 35; Alvin B. Rubin & Gilbert Ganucheau, Appellate Delay and 
Cost-An Ancient and Common Disease: Is It Intractable?, 42 Mn. L. REV. 752 (1983). See gener-
ally JoE s. CECIL & DONNA STIENSTRA, DECIDING CASES WITHOUT ARGUMENT (Federal Judicial 
Center 1987); ABA Report, supra note 34, at 526. 
••• See FED. R. APP. P. 36; BAKER, supra note 4, at 158-64; William L. Reynolds & William 
M. Richman, An Evaluation of Limited Publication in the United States Courts of Appeals: The 
Price of Reform, 48 U. Cm. L. REV. 573 (1981); Lauren K. Robel, The Myth of the Disposable 
Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United States Courts of Appeals, 
87 MICH. L. REV. 940 (1989). See generally WRIGHT, supra note 162, at 767. 
••• For discussions of rigor, see Carl Tobias, Great Expectations and Mismatched Compensa-
tion: Government Sponsored Public Participation in Proceedings of the Consumer Product Safety 
Commission, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 1101, 1164 (1986); Carl W. Tobias, Of Public Funds and Public 
Participation: Resolving the Issue of Agency Authority to Reimburse Public Participants in Adminis-
trative Proceedings, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 906, 954 (1982). 
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serve as valuable models.271 Congress could also explore whether it should 
encourage a broader exchange of ideas regarding promising approaches, 
although the circuits, particularly through the judicial councils, and bodies 
such as the F JC and the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts, already promote much interchange. 
2. Additional Study 
Congress could authorize additional study of the appeals courts and 
their dockets. The numerous analyses of the ostensible difficulties that 
mounting appellate caseloads create and the many remedies prescribed-a 
number of which have been reviewed in this Article-may suggest that 
the complications and their solutions have received adequate examination 
and that Congress should now act.272 
The advisability of undertaking another evaluation, nonetheless, finds 
support in the disagreement about whether the phenomena ascribed to 
increasing dockets actually produce difficulties that are sufficiently troub-
ling to warrant treatment, and, if so, which responses would be most effi-
cacious. Indeed, the Federal Courts Study Committee urged that a careful, 
comprehensive assessment be performed to overcome imperfect knowledge 
of the relevant complications, their impacts, and potential remedies.273 
Professor Baker made a similar recommendation after conducting an ex-
haustive survey of the circuits.274 
271 See, e.g., THOMAS WILLGING, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PROCESS (Federal Judicial 
Center 1988); Terence Dunworth & James S. Kakalik, Preliminary Observations on Implementation 
of the Pilot Program of the Civil justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1303 (1994). See 
generally Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 judicial Improvements Acts, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 1589 (1994). 
272 See Reinhardt, supra note 189, at 1512. After all, as Judge Reinhardt states, evaluators have 
conducted ten major studies. See also BAKER, supra note 4, at 33-43 (summarizing ten studies}. 
273 See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109, at 116-17; see also 
Charles Alan Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 1 GA. L. REV. 563, 575 
(1967). 
21
• See BAKER, supra note 4, at 292-300; Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act 
and Civil justice Reform Act, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, 
and the Administration of Justice of the House Committee on the judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 91 
(1990) (prepared statement of Joseph F. Weis, Jr., Chairman, Federal Courts Study Committee, and 
Senior Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit} [hereinafter Weis statement). 
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The specifics of such an evaluation require relatively brief treatment 
here, as analogous study proposals have been examined elsewhere.2711 The 
success of the Federal Courts Study Committee indicates that it could 
serve as a helpful model,276 even though senators and representatives 
should attempt to learn from the problems that the Committee encoun-
tered to avoid repeating them. Illustrative are legislative assignment to an 
entity which consisted of individuals with demanding professional occupa-
tions of the responsibility for scrutinizing most of the federal courts' struc-
ture, jurisdiction, procedures, and practices in an eighteen month period. 
This idea suggests that Congress might seriously consider funding a full-
time professional staff, crafting a narrow, particularized charge, and giv-
ing the group at least two years to complete its work. 
Congress should create an entity like the Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee, which would include representatives from Congress, the federal 
judiciary, the Executive Branch, state governments, bar associations, and 
law schools.277 Senators and representatives, preferably Judiciary Com-
mittee members, must have considerable representation and must actively 
participate, although federal judges ought to serve and provide much in-
put. The chair should probably be a member of Congress, but could also 
be a jurist, perhaps a Supreme Court Justice. 
Congress must appropriate adequate resources to cover the costs of 
hearings and travel and to support a staff comprised of full-time profes-
sionals. 278 Some of these personnel should have the expertise to undertake 
extensive, empirical research in the social sciences, assess demographic 
trends, balance conflicting data, and assemble additional information on 
the future demands that the federal courts will confront. 
The committee's membership and staff must be inclusive, and it ought 
to maximize the involvement of interested individuals and organiza-
tions. 279 The group should enlist the assistance of public and private insti-
tutions such as the Judicial Conference, the FJC, the Justice Department, 
21
• See BAKER, supra note 4, at 292-300; see also Thomas E. Baker, A Proposal That Congress 
Create a Commission on Federal Court Structure, 14 Miss. C. L. REV. 271 (1994); Tobias, supra 
note 271, at 1627 . 
... See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 109. 
277 I rely substantially in this paragraph on BAKER, supra note 4, at 296-99; Weis statement, 
supra note 274. 
278 I rely substantially in this paragraph on BAKER, supra note 4, at 297. 
279 I rely substantially in this paragraph on BAKER, supra note 4, at 297-99. 
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the Judiciary Committees, the American Bar Association, the American 
Law Institute, and the National Center for State Courts, which possess a 
wealth of information and expertise relating to the federal circuits. 280 The 
committee must institute special efforts to draw on the experiences of the 
states in reforming their appellate courts. 281 
Congress should request that the entity pinpoint as specifically as possi-
ble the phenomena attributable to expanding appeals court dockets and 
ascertain whether the difficulties are problematic enough to deserve treat-
ment, and, if so, identify appropriate solutions. The commission must an-
alyze these remedies in light of their potential benefits and disadvantages 
and the appellate ideal. The group could then develop proposed legislative 
reforms and criteria by which Congress can evaluate them.282 
Once this entity makes its recommendations to Congress, Congress 
should evaluate the possibilities and draft measures incorporating the most 
promising alternatives.283 After the Senate and the House conduct public 
hearings on these options, Congress can probably reach consensus on the 
best means of addressing appellate caseload growth in the twenty-first 
century.284 
C. Suggested Improvements in Senate Bill 956 
Much of the preceding discussion, in particular the evidence which 
shows that splitting the Ninth Circuit is unnecessary and the relatively 
few propositions favoring the court's division, demonstrates that Congress 
should leave the Ninth Circuit intact. More specifically, bifurcation's nu-
merical and qualitative detriments eclipse its benefits. Indeed, the weight 
280 This list is obviously not intended to be exhaustive. See also BAKER, supra note 4, at 295-96 
(affording additional suggestions). 
281 See BAKER, supra note 4, at 298. The National Center for State Courts will obviously be 
helpful in this regard. See generally COFFIN, supra note 153, at 43-65 (advocating the use of states' 
experiences in fashioning remedies); DANIEL J. MEADOR, APPELLATE COURTS (1974) (same). 
282 See BAKER, supra note 4, at 296-97. 
283 I rely substantially in this paragraph on BAKER, sitpra note 4, at 296-97. See generally 
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 5, at 107 (the designers of any new judicial machinery will be 
a success if they meet the needs of their generation). 
•
9
• The committee may experience difficulty specifically identifying those difficulties caused by 
increasing caseloads or find that growing dockets are insufficiently problematic to deserve treatment, 
and, even if they are more troubling, that less ambitious solutions than national approaches, such as 
circuit-specific remedies, are more appropriate. 
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of available evidence against circuit-splitting nearly dissuades me from 
even advancing recommendations for improving Senate Bill 956, lest the 
suggestions somehow be misconstrued as endorsing an approach that I 
believe is flawed. 
If the evidence already adduced fails to persuade the members of Con-
gress, and they seriously consider S. 956, Congress should carefully ex-
plore ways to improve it. Perhaps most important, Congress should allo-
cate the requisite resources, particularly the numbers of judges authorized, 
that will enable the new Ninth and Twelfth Circuits to discharge their 
responsibilities, especially to resolve appeals expeditiously, inexpensively, 
and fairly. 
The proposed legislation, as originally introduced, would have assigned 
nineteen active judges to the new Ninth Circuit and seven active judges to 
the proposed Twelfth Circuit.2811 As modified, the bill allocates nineteen 
judges to the proposed Ninth Circuit and nine judges to the proposed 
Twelfth.288 Certain factors complicate efforts to identify the exact number 
of judges who would be appropriate for the two new circuits. For exam-
ple, it is very difficult to predict with precision the number and complex-
ity of filings that each court will receive, the speed with which the circuits 
will resolve appeals, and the effects which division will have on the courts' 
disposition rates. 287 
Nevertheless, comparatively accurate estimates can be derived from 
some relevant information. Most significant, increasing workloads led the 
Ninth Circuit to request ten more judges in 1992, and the Judicial Con-
ference of the United States recommended that Congress authorize the 
judgeships the next year.288 Indeed, Senator Gorton acknowledged five 
years ago that the court's caseload would have justified the addition of ten 
judges.289 
2
•• See 141 CONG. REC. S7497 (daily ed. May 25, 1995). 
288 See 141 CONG. REC. S10436-37 (daily ed. July 20, 1995). 
287 Another important factor will be the new courts to which senior judges elect to be assigned 
because the Ninth Circuit's senior judges have assumed a significant portion of the court's workload. 
See s. 956 § 7. See generally PATRICK WALKER, THE WORK OF SENIOR JUDGES IN THE U.S. 
DISTRICT COURTS DURING 1985, 1990 AND 1992 (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Statis-
tics Division, 1994). 
288 See Albert, supra note 45. 
289 See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
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It is also possible to formulate reasonably reliable approximations by 
compiling recent statistics involving the quantity, difficulty, and disposi-
tion rate of appeals arising from the proposed circuits' districts, adjusting 
for applicable variables, and projecting these estimates into the future. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit Executive Office calculated the number of fil-
ings per three-judge panel for the existing Ninth Circuit and the two pro-
posed circuits. 290 
Those estimates show that Senate Bill 956's recommended allocation of 
the Ninth Circuit's judges between the proposed courts will provide no 
caseload relief to the new Ninth Circuit. Indeed, it would require that the 
circuit hear a larger, more complex and more time-consuming docket than 
the current Ninth and the proposed Twelfth Circuits. 291 Congress may 
also want to allow for the predictable and unforeseeable difficulties which 
will attend the creation of the two new circuits. 
The above ideas, particularly the Executive Office figures, suggest that 
Congress should authorize more than ten additional judges for the new 
courts, a majority of whom would serve on the proposed Ninth Circuit292 
and ought to assign this new court approximately three times as many 
judges as the proposed Twelfth Circuit.293 If Congress disagrees with 
these recommendations, it should create a sufficient number of additional 
judgeships and distribute them between the two courts, so that the circuits 
can perform their duties effectively.294 
••• See supra text accompanying notes 137-38. 
2
•
1 See supra text accompanying notes 138-43. 
••• Both the total number of judges and their allocation are approximations that I derived pri-
marily from the Executive Office statistics and Ninth Circuit and Judicial Conference requests. These 
requests may be out of date in light of caseload increases. See supra notes 124, 137-43, 288-89 and 
accompanying text. Indeed, it is arguable that Congress should assign all of the additional judges 
recommended to the proposed Ninth Circuit, especially in light of the small, relatively uncomplicated 
docket which the proposed Twelfth Circuit will have and the potential for underutilization of its 
resources. See supra text accompanying note 148. 
••• The multiplier is an approximation that I premised primarily on the Executive Office 
figures. See supra notes 137-43 and accompanying text. If Congress does not authorize additional 
judges for the new courts, it should seriously consider allocating judges between the two circuits in 
accordance with the multiplier. I realize that nine judges comprise a workable complement for consti-
tuting panels, but six would as well and would give the Twelfth Circuit the identical composition of 
the First Circuit, the nation's smallest. See generally Breyer, supra note 257. 
•o< The polestar that Congress should use and that I have employed is the effective discharge of 
judicial duties. Similar considerations apply to the allocation of other resources. The Ninth Circuit 
Executive's Office illustrates this. Congress should provide sufficient resources to replicate that entity, 
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If Congress remains unconvinced by the evidence above and decides to 
examine S. 956 seriously, it must prescribe a workable composition for 
both new appeals courts. The difficulty with assigning states to the pro-
posed appellate courts is that the current Ninth Circuit defies logical divi-
sion. 295 The following attempt to identify a practicable realignment of the 
court demonstrates that the existing circuit resists effective division, and, 
indeed, that the better solution is to leave the court as presently 
configured. 
The Ninth Circuit as envisioned by Senate Bill 956 is one starting 
point. As discussed above, any appeals court encompassing California 
would serve more than thirty million people and confront an enormous 
and complex caseload. 296 These considerations are magnified because S. 
956 places in the Ninth Circuit Arizona with its large, increasing popu-
lace, and Nevada, which is the country's most rapidly growing jurisdic-
tion, and both generate substantial appellate filings, many of which are 
complex. 
The proposed Ninth Circuit will have a large, complex docket and a 
less favorable ratio of three-judge panels to appeals than the current 
Ninth and the new Twelfth Circuits. The Ninth Circuit as contemplated 
by Senate Bill 956 would, therefore, realize no actual caseload relief and 
will have relatively few judges to treat a gigantic number of filings, many 
of them complicated, in the near term, and this situation will only worsen 
over time.297 In short, the composition of the proposed Ninth Circuit 
would be less satisfactory than the constitution of the current court. 
The obvious alternatives to the Ninth Circuit which S. 956 prescribes 
may be preferable. These possibilities include assigning Arizona, Nevada, 
although any newly created Circuit Executive's Office will experience great difficulty attaining the 
reputation for excellence of the Ninth Circuit Office. Resource allocations for buildings and other 
technical details are beyond the scope of this Article, although Congress must consider them. See 
supra notes 67-68, 146-48 and accompanying text. I feel compelled to reiterate that my recommenda-
tions should not be misinterpreted as an endorsement of bifurcation, an approach that I believe is 
flawed. 
29
" See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
296 See supra notes 46-71, 137-40 and accompanying text. Because the disadvantages are more 
important to the analysis here, I emphasize them. 
297 Of course, Congress could respond to the new Ninth Circuit's circumstances by authorizing 
additional judgeships. See supra notes 288-89 and accompanying text. Much of the above analysis 
suggests that this would not be an optimal solution, particularly for the appellate system. See supra 
notes 160-207 and accompanying text. 
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Hawaii, Guam, or the Northern Mariana Islands to the new Twelfth 
Circuit. Inclusion of either or both mainland districts will afford the pro-
posed Ninth Circuit a measure of caseload relief.298 However, this re-
alignment would not create an appeals court consisting of adjacent juris-
dictions that share a common background, 299 thus violating the Hruska 
Commission's contiguity principle.300 No states now designated to com-
prise the new Twelfth Circuit adjoin Arizona, and the major population 
centers in Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon, and Washington are located 
far from those of Arizona and Nevada. Neither Arizona nor Nevada cor-
respondingly has very much in common with the five northwestern states. 
Instituting certain procedures, such as locating administrative units in 
Boise or Reno and relying more heavily on technology, could ameliorate 
the difficulties created by distance. Because the benefits of placing Arizona 
or Nevada in the proposed Twelfth Circuit appear to outweigh the disad-
vantages, this may be a feasible, albeit unsatisfactory, approach. 
California presents a conundrum.301 Observers have found that as-
signing California's federal districts to separate appellate courts would be 
problematic because each circuit could construe California law differ-
ently. 302 The Hruska Commission contended that the potential for incon-
sistency would not produce unmanageable complications, as the possibility 
of inconsistency already existed in every regional appeals court.303 Profes-
sor Hellman argued that "none of the conflicts likely to arise in the di-
vided-state situation are unique" and predicted that the judicial system 
could preserve "harmony between two federal appellate courts sitting 
within one state."304 Nevertheless, the Hruska Commission's recommen-
dation that Congress split California was controversial in 1973 and 
delayed legislative consideration of the Ninth Circuit's bifurcation for a 
decade,305 and the idea of dividing California has received relatively little 
support since. 
298 Inclusion of Hawaii, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands would afford little caseload 
relief, but would impose costs. See supra note 141. 
••• See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text. Consider the contrast between Arizona and 
Alaska. Although Nevada adjoins Oregon, it differs substantially from the five states of the Pacific 
Northwest. 
300 See supra text accompanying note 25. 
301 See supra notes 46-71, 137-38, 296 and accompanying text. 
302 See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 238-39. 
303 See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 238-39. 
30
' See Hellman, supra note 22, at 1281. 
300 See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text. 
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The notion of creating an appeals court consisting solely of California 
has never been seriously entertained because of the significant disadvan-
tages that it would seemingly impose. For example, the Hruska Commis-
sion observed that a "one-state circuit would lack the diversity of back-
ground and attitude brought to a court by judges who have lived and 
practiced in different states" and described this characteristic as a "highly 
desirable, and perhaps essential, condition" for constituting circuits.308 
The Commission was also concerned that one senator with long tenure 
who actively participated in the appointments process could shape the 
court for a whole generation.307 In sum, the options proposed for directly 
treating the problems that have been attributed to California are simply 
impractical. 
The Twelfth Circuit that S. 956 envisions offers more benefits than 
detriments, but only if the substantial disadvantages which bifurcation 
would impose on the new Ninth Circuit are ignored. 308 The benefits and 
the detriments of the proposed Twelfth Circuit have already been ex-
amined thoroughly in this Article. 309 
Perhaps most importantly, the very favorable ratio of three-judge 
panels to appeals which Senate Bill 956 allocates to the Twelfth Circuit 
and its relatively homogeneous, uncomplicated docket would afford con-
siderable immediate and future caseload relief.310 The relatively few 
judges serving on the new Twelfth Circuit should also foster more colle-
gial relationships and ,enhanced productivity among them.311 
A number of the projected gains, however, could fail to materialize, and 
certain ostensible benefits might not even warrant that characterization. 
Most importantly, it may be inaccurate to describe as advantages numer-
308 See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 237; see also supra note 56 and accompanying 
text (affording similar ideas regarding diversity in Ninth Circuit). 
307 See Hruska Commission, supra note 21, at 237; see also Hruska Commission, supra note 21, 
at 236-37 (rejecting as "clearly inferior" a suggested realignment identical to S. 948 except that Ari-
zona would be included in the Tenth Circuit). 
308 The proposed Twelfth Circuit would be more likely to realize those benefits if Congress 
appropriates sufficient resources. 
309 See supra notes 137-43, 151-53 and accompanying text. 
310 See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text. 
311 See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text. 
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ous significant gains which will accompany the Twelfth Circuit's highly 
beneficial ratio of judges to filings and its less complex docket because 
those advantages would accrue at the expense of the proposed Ninth Cir-
cuit. Some benefits will also be delayed or will be rather costly to achieve. 
Furthermore, the smaller complement of judges might not necessarily b~ 
more collegial, and the Twelfth Circuit's size could sacrifice diversity and 
the flexibility to make special assignments. 
In sum, Senate Bill 956's plan to split the existing Ninth Circuit ap-
pears unworkable. Its detrimental aspects outweigh the advantages. The 
proposed Twelfth Circuit would have a positive cost-benefit ratio, espe-
cially if its start-up and permanent expenditures are discounted, but this 
would come at the expense of the new Ninth Circuit. Unfortunately, the 
alternatives, particularly those which would expressly address California, 
are only marginally more palatable. In the final analysis, Congress should 
leave the Ninth Circuit as currently constituted and appropriate the re-
sources that the court needs to fulfill its mandate. 312 
CONCLUSION 
In 1990, Senator Hatfield asserted that "for too long, the problems fac-
ing the Ninth Circuit, and the entire federal court system for that matter, 
have not received the thoughtful attention of Congress and the public dis-
cussion they deserve."313 This observation is equally true today as it was 
in 1990.314 
312 I have included the suggestions relating to experimentation in this footnote, lest textual place-
ment give them undeserved validity and be misinterpreted as my endorsement of bifurcation, an ap-
proach which I consider faulty. Congress could mandate a broad range of experiments in the proposed 
Ninth and Twelfth Circuits. The proposed Ninth Circuit, by virtue of its composition and caseload, 
could continue to apply many of the experimental approaches involving, for instance, technology, on 
which the current Ninth Circuit relies. The proposed Twelfth Circuit might wish to use these and 
numerous additional options, such as prebriefing conferences, that other appeals courts have utilized. 
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, both because of the large number of judges and cases filed and the 
recent split of the former Fifth Circuit, should be fruitful sources of ideas for more testing and for 
anticipating and treating the predictable and unforeseeable difficulties which will attend division. See 
supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text. 
313 See BAKER, supra note 4, at 99 (citing S. 948 Hearing, supra note 4, at 250-51) (statement 
of Sen. Mark 0. Hatfield)). 
••• Congress did enact the Civil Justice Reform Act later in 1990 after passing a Judicial Im-
provements Act in 1988. See Tobias, supra note 271. 
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Division, however, will solve the difficulties neither of the Ninth Circuit 
nor of the other appeals courts. Bifurcation will not remedy most compli-
cations that the Ninth Circuit in particular, and the appellate system in 
general, will confront in the twenty-first century. The quantitative and 
qualitative disadvantages of splitting appeals courts clearly outweigh their 
advantages. Bifurcation would accomplish nothing new and would elimi-
nate the best appellate court for experimenting with solutions to the 
problems faced by large circuits. 315 Indeed, there is a lack of consensus 
about whether burgeoning appeals court dockets cause problems that are 
sufficiently serious to warrant treatment, especially with mechanisms that 
are as controversial as circuit-splitting. 
The import of the information which has been presented here suggests 
that Congress should reject as anachronistic both the Ninth Circuit's divi-
sion and the broader notion of creating additional judgeships and bifur-
cating appellate courts. A better approach appears to be structural modifi-
cation, perhaps in the form of consolidation. If Congress finds this 
proposal too controversial, it should explore additional circuit court exper-
imentation and more study of appeals courts and their increasing 
caseloads. Congress must attempt to identify as conclusively as possible 
whether docket growth creates complications that are sufficiently problem-
atic to be addressed, and, if so, with what measures. If Congress is not 
convinced by the persuasive evidence against circuit-splitting, and, thus, 
seriously considers Senate Bill 956, it ought to adopt the recommendations 
for improving the proposed legislation presented in this Article. 
310 See supra notes 32-37, 204-06 and accompanying text. 
